
MASKIROVKA: THE BENEFIT OF THE OTHER UNDER THE GUISE OF DECEPTION

Considerations on the Russian method of Epistemological Warfare

By Pierre Beaudry, 5/30/2016

FOREWORD

The irony of the present world strategic situation lies in the fact that most American leaders are incapable of understanding the way the Russians and the Chinese think about war, because all they expect from them is deception.

This report on the Russian method of *Maskirovka*, that is, on what became known as “deception warfare,” is intended to reveal the truth behind the surprise 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and show how to avoid nuclear World War III in the immediate future.

The report has four sections:

1. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL NATURE OF MASKIROVKA
2. HOW RUSSIA USED MASKIROVKA AGAINST NAPOLEON
3. THE MASKIROVKA OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
4. NOTE ON THE 1962 KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV CORRESPONDENCE

INTRODUCTION

A New Just World Economic Order is currently being formed by means of the principle of the Peace of Westphalia between China and Russia, which appears to be a deception for Americans because some fools in the United States think they are preparing for war. The irony of the matter is that American and European sanctions against Russia have successfully eliminated the differences between those two great Asiatic nations, and the reality of that principle in action is a benefit for all of mankind. This benefit has been delivered in the form of an epistemological warfare known to the Russians as *Maskirovka*. However, this form of counter-intelligence is not a deception, as most strategists believe; it represents an effective prevention of war under the guise of a wonderful deception.

The irony of the present strategic situation is that in its last two years of economic warfare against Russia, the United States has not only succeeded in increasing the economic growth between Russia and China, but it has also caused the transfer from the geopolitical-unipolar dimensionality of the petrodollar into a win-win multi-dimensional and multipolar new monetary system based on the PetroYuan credit system. As a result, the birth of the PetroYuan which took place in June 2015, will now have replaced the dying Petrodollar by June, 2016. As was reported by [*Voltaire Network*](#):

“In place of humiliating Russia, the “economic war” that Washington and Brussels had promoted was counterproductive, since it only contributed to fortify the energy team between Moscow and Beijing. We recall that in May of 2014 the Russian company Gazprom agreed to supply gas to China up to 38 billion cubic meters annually during three decades (starting in 2018) through the signing of a contract for 400 billion US dollars with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNCP). [...]

“The Russian-Chinese energy alliance is proposed to go longer. Moscow and Beijing have made their interchanges of petroleum a channel of transition towards a multipolar monetary system, that is to say, a system that

is no longer based on the dollar alone, but takes into account various currencies and above all, that reflects the correlation of forces in the current world order. The economic sanctions imposed by Washington and Brussels drove the Russians to eliminate the dollar and the euro from their commercial and financial transactions, since otherwise, they would be too exposed to suffer sabotage in the moment of realizing buying and selling operations with their principal trading partners.”

(Ariel Noyola Rodriguez, **The petroyuan is the big bet of Russia and China**, <http://www.voltairenet.org/article191837.html>.)

The point of the matter, and the Voltaire Network has unfortunately missed the full irony of this situation, is that the petroyuan “bet” is merely the “deceptive” tip of the iceberg. The time has come where the win-win policy based on the “correlation of forces” between nations rather than the British “geopolitical” relations between them, has now been solidly established and is rapidly becoming the corner stone of a new economic world order replacing the British controlled old world order of American Exceptionalism. The beauty is that this new arrangement is based on the Peace of Westphalia principle of the *benefit of the other*.

It is now just a matter of time when the bankrupt monetary system of the western world will be forced to break with the British Empire and join the BRICS countries in order to form a New Just World Economic Order based on the full development of mankind. This is possibly the best example, today, of the effectiveness of *Maskirovka* as a strategic policy for peace, thanks to the United States aggressive policy toward Russia and China. China and Russia should be very grateful for this wonderful gift from the United States. That’s the way you want to do a reading of what the Russians are up to in the world. However, the question is: “Will the new form of economic cooperation in Asia become a durable friendship based on mutual human development or a short-lived gamble based on monetary self-interest?” [See Larouchepac.com [These are Days of Decision for the World](#)]

1. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL NATURE OF MASKIROVKA

“The purpose of Maskirovka is for the truth to seep through under a cloud of deception.”

Dehors Debonneheure

The net effect of the change taking place in the world in favor of a new peaceful world economic order with the BRICS as opposed to a Third World War is the fact that the Russians have been consolidating their economic future with China and the New Silk Road in preparation for a feedback to an improved negotiating position with their European Union partners.

This backfiring, expressed recently by the resolution of French Senator Yves Pozzo di Borgo [great grandson of Napoleon's controller] to get rid of the Anti-Russian sanctions, the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier's statements against the Russia sanctions, and the comments of German historian Michael Stuermer about the dangers of a nuclear war, should be a signal of opportunity for the United States to join with the New World Economic Order of the BRICS, as soon as possible. The Russian method of *Maskirovka* is obviously contrary to the British-American geopolitical warfare model, but it is not understood for what it is, in truth, by American strategists. The Russian method, generally known as the *Maskirovka* method of epistemological warfare, is a superior method of counter-intelligence to British push and shove geopolitics and its title of nobility can be found in the continual fight and victory it has won against fascism since the defeat of Napoleon in 1812.

The forming of this new process of partnership between Russia and China has taken decades to evolve and has been effective, because it is the only human way to think strategically for the benefit of mankind as a whole. This method of *Maskirovka* must be implemented, now worldwide, as the players are discovering the virtues of the New Silk Road of peace initiated by Xi Jinping in collaboration with the Schiller Institute led by Helga Zepp-LaRouche.

This is not a matter of choice or of practicality, as most people would think of it, but a matter of principle; that is, the principle of the *Benefit of the Other* that Cardinal Jules Mazarin established at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. You might want to ask: How can the *Benefit of the Other* be a Russian deployment of *Maskirovka* (*Маскировка*); that is, a method of preventing war by superior counter-intelligence?

Maskirovka is a Russian strategic maneuver which was first designed as a preventive and defensive strategic policy during the Napoleonic War, and was later perfected during World War II as the most efficient form of counter-intelligence method of warfare by the Soviet military genius, Marshal Georgy Zhukov. I recommend that the reader take a look at the report Rachel Douglas has recently provided us from the Moscow correspondent, John Helmer, [WHITE HORSES, RED LINES – MARSHAL GEORGY ZHUKOV'S GUIDE TO SURPRISING AND DEFEATING RUSSIA'S ENEMY](#), May 11, 2016.

In substance Helmer had a very insightful understanding of the Russian “unexpected” method of epistemological warfare, which can be summarized in the following ten paragraphs of his report:

[...] *“The war which started two years ago may be waged with Zhukov’s tenacity and some of his tactics, but command has passed, not to a Zhukov, nor to a Stalin, but to the Stavka. If you don’t know what that was, and is, now is a good time to ask. But the answer is a secret. The war the Stavka wages will be a surprise.*”



Figure 1 Marshal Georgy Zhukov (<http://russia-insider.com/en/russias-secret-weapon/ri14297>)

“The first surprise is that there will be no announcements of Russian strategy, operation directions, targets, or battle concepts. The concept most often associated in western military thinking with Zhukov, and also with Stalin, is that the best defence is always attack. Stalin himself said it in his graduation speech to the Red Army’s staff academies on May 5, 1941: “The policy of peace is a good thing. We have up to now...carried out a line [based on] defense. And now...when we have become stronger, it is necessary to go from defense to offense. Defending our country we must act offensively. From defense to go to a military doctrine of offensive actions....The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army.”

“For offense to succeed, intelligence on the enemy’s readiness and vulnerabilities must be good. Counter-intelligence, concealment of preparations, deception, and maskirovka are also required.

“The obvious and catastrophic fact is that at the very moment Stalin was proposing to surprise with attack, he was contradicting his own doctrine; rejecting the conclusions of his intelligence services, including military intelligence (GRU), that Germany was about to attack; and refusing to implement the plans proposed by his generals to counter the German attack by moving pre-emptively. Six weeks after his offense speech, on the morning of June 22, 1941, Stalin woke up to Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion.

“When Putin announced that “everything has a limit” and “our western partners have crossed the line”, he was acknowledging that he had just had his own Barbarossa wake-up. So far as is publicly known, no one at GRU, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Defence Ministry, or the General Staff has been blamed, punished, scapegoated, or shot for the Russian failure to anticipate, deter, or neutralize the US Government’s putsch in Kiev of February 21-22, 2014. The Crimean move which followed was classic defence by offense – and its swift effectiveness a strategic surprise.



Figure 2 Operation Barbarossa, 1941.

“Three years earlier, in March 2011, then-President Dmitry Medvedev had had his Barbarossa moment. This came after he had ordered the Russian representative at the United Nations Security Council to accept the no-fly zone over Libya which started the US and NATO war against Libya, the assassination of Muammar al-Qaddafi, and the movement of armed forces and flight of large populations to the east, west, south, and north, including Malta and Italy.



Figure 3 “Source: National Geographic -- Interactive Map on Irregular Migration Routes and Flows in Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean Region: <http://news.nationalgeographic.com>”

“Compare Putin’s “crossing the line” declaration with Medvedev’s remark: “Unfortunately, we see from the developments now unfolding that real military action has begun. This is something that cannot be allowed to happen... Russia did not use its power of veto for the simple reason that I do not consider the resolution in question wrong. Moreover, I think that overall this resolution reflects our understanding of events in Libya too, but not completely. This is why we decided not to use our power of veto. This, you realize, was a qualified decision not to veto the resolution, and the consequences of this decision were obvious. It would be wrong for us to start flapping about now and say that we didn’t know what we were doing. This was a conscious decision on our part. Such were the instructions I gave to the Foreign Ministry, and they were carried out.”



Figure 4 Source: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/10701>

« Medvedev might have said Libya was of next to no value to Russia's defence. He didn't. He could have mentioned that Russia opposes foreign intervention in the internal affairs of states. Instead, he declared Russia's Operation Kibbitzer – Russia would look over the shoulders of the other powers, while they applied their forces for regime change, advising them: “any use of force should be in proportion to events.” (John Helmer, [WHITE HORSES, RED LINES – MARSHAL GEORGY ZHUKOV'S GUIDE TO SURPRISING AND DEFEATING RUSSIA'S ENEMY](#), May 11, 2016.)

The fact that Obama's 2011 attack against Libya in Benghazi including his assassination of Kaddafi was a new “Operation Barbarossa,” was not merely noted by Lyndon LaRouche in the US, but was also recorded by the Russian leadership in Moscow as the precursor of a new world war. In retrospect, not only is it useful to recall, as Helmer did, the strategic moment of the Libyan shift on the part of NATO, but also the manner in which Medvedev responded to the event.

It is obviously wrong to consider *Maskirovka* as simply a deception ploy. It is much more a superior method of intelligence warfare which must include the

knowledge of your enemy within your own assessment as a preventive measure to win the peace. In fact, unless you know the mind-frame of your enemy, his real strengths and weaknesses, you will lose the war.

In other words, unexpected moves such as those executed by what Putin did in Chechnya, Ukraine, Crimea, Syria, and the surprise he just pulled in Palmyra are the only way to win in warfare. So, the secret is that you must cultivate in your own mind something that your enemy would never think you would be able to do, because he would never think of doing it, himself. The idea is not that you should simply do what your opponent would never think of doing, but that you should never do what he expects you to do. The secret of knowing your enemy lies in his expectation.

Take the Palmyra concert as an example. Americans would never dream of doing a classical concert like that, nor would they ever be able to understand why the Chaconne for unaccompanied violin by Johann Sebastian Bach was the perfect form of “prayer” properly executed in memory of the victims of the Syrian War. Who suspected that the Chaconne would be a perfect musical *Maskirovka* expressing the *benefit of the other* under the guise of a deception?

Something spectacular takes place when an exceptional violinist performs the “Chaconne,” because Bach set this richly layered musical composition as a rare experience of musically opening one’s soul for the departed loved ones; that is, for the privileged person who has given his life for a better future of mankind. For an admirer of insightfulness, the 12 minutes of this creative solo violin masterpiece without orchestra, which ends the Partita No. 2 in D Minor, was composed to celebrate the creative power of mind.

The sublime character of the Partita was composed around 1720 after the death of Bach’s wife, Maria Barbara, mother of seven of his children. The last movement, the Chaconne, was reportedly dedicated to the Holy Trinity. In a letter to Clara Schumann, Johannes Brahms wrote about the Chaconne:

“On one stave, for a small instrument, the man writes a whole world of the deepest thoughts and most powerful feelings. If I imagined that I

could have created, even conceived the piece, I am quite certain that the excess of excitement and earth-shattering experience would have driven me out of my mind. If one doesn't have the greatest violinist around, then it is well the most beautiful pleasure to simply listen to its sound in one's mind."
(Schumann and Brahms 1927)



Figure 5 Russia's Mariinsky Orchestra performing at the Palmyra, Syria on May 5, 2016.

2. HOW RUSSIA USED MASKIROVKA AGAINST NAPOLEON

The strategic significance of *Maskirovka* goes back to the Russian defeat of Napoleon during the winter of 1812-1813. As soon as Czar Alexander I perceived the designs of Napoleon on Russia, he began to internalized how he could defeat him, not by recruiting an army that could come up against the “Grande Armée,” but by outsmarting the most brilliant commander who ever came up against him. Alexander knew that Napoleon wanted to win swift victories, followed up with short negotiations over lost and gained territories, and finally sprinkle his defeated enemy with a few magnanimous gestures, including a lesson in grand strategy.

This is what Alexander knew about the mind of Napoleon. However, Alexander did not follow that profile and, instead, he decided to fight a different war by never acceding to Napoleon’s expectations. Alexander kept Napoleon waiting: Moscow burnt, and the “Grande Armée” had to go back home or die of starvation in the middle of winter.

General Winter was certainly one of the most effective allies of Russia, but the decisive moment came when the French retreat turned into a rout as they were driven out of Russia by a well nourished and warmly dressed Russian Army, which was waiting for the right moment. There is a [famous graph](#) of the Napoleon retreat from Russia which speaks volumes: 422,000 soldiers went in, and 10,000 went out, followed by a well-fed Russian army all the way to Paris.




Figure 6 A Wall Street type of graph representing the proportion of French troops during the Russian Campaign of 1812-1813 by M. Minard, Inspector General of Bridges and Roads, Paris, Nov. 1869. This shows the infantile stupidity of stock market bluffing.

The chart shows 422,000 French troops [beige color] diminishing as they get closer to Moscow [right], and diminishing even more [black] as they retreat from Moscow to the level of 10,000 men at the Niemen River [left]. The difference in temperature at the time is shown to be between -9 degrees and -30 degrees Celsius as the troops retreated to the frozen Niemen River that Cossacks crossed on horseback chasing the remnants of the “Grande Armée” out of Russia. The [Russian Insider](#) gives a succinct account of the *Maskirovka* principle as follows:

“In short: Alexander understood how Napoleon did things and surprised him with proper preparation and a full strategy. This, I believe, is the essence of the "Russian way in warfare". Know and understand the enemy and surprise him. We have just seen this again in Syria. And, for that matter, over and over again in the Ukraine crisis where nothing has gone the way Nuland & Co intended. And in Ossetia in 2008.” ([Two Centuries of Russian Surprises – Why Are We Surprised?](#))

No use going in details about the similar mistake made by Hitler at the beginning of World War II. Suffice it to say that when Stalin made the decision to go against the popular wisdom of his own general staff and rejected their proposal to launch a preemptive attack against Hitler, in June of 1941, it was because he had been listening to Marshal Georgy Zhukov on the subject of *Maskirovka*. The lesson was clear and became most emphatically exemplified in 1942, when Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus was forced to surrender the encircled German 6th Army at the end of the Battle of Stalingrad.



Figure 7 Marshal Georgy Zhukov

3. THE MASKIROVKA OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

“You can’t trust any intelligence report about anything; you can only trust your own mind.”

Dehors Debonneheure

Similarly, the Soviet intelligence service and the Red Army had made extensive use of *Maskirovka* in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. According to CIA analyst, James Hansen, it took four decades before American Intelligence could figure out and understand the full scope of how the Soviets had deployed their strategic missile in the backyard of the United States’ neighbor, Cuba.

The true secret of *Maskirovka* does not lie in deception, as most military strategists believe, but in prevention of war. That's why Americans are always taken by surprise by the Russians; they expect deception, even from their closest collaborators. They don't seem to understand that the idea of *Maskirovka* is to prevent the enemy from making tragic mistakes. Preventing your enemy from knowing the nature, the magnitude, and the timing of your military operation means you are giving him a chance to stop his folly before it is too late. That is why *Maskirovka* is the art of preventing your enemy from knowing what you are



doing. Ultimately, it is the art of preventing him from shooting himself in the foot, when he is too stupid to realize that what you are doing is for his benefit. In other words, the mastery of *Maskirovka* requires that your mind function from the vantage point of a higher manifold of the *Benefit of the Other*. Let's look at how the Cuban Missile Crisis was an effective master class in *Maskirovka*.

Figure 8 Range of Soviet SS-4 medium-range ballistic missiles and SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Cuba.

The Soviets intelligence code name for the Cuban Missile operation was ANADYR, which was designed to prevent both Russian and foreign military personnel from knowing about the destination of the operation. ANADYR is the name of a river flowing into the Bering Sea, a location which could not be further away from Cuba in anyone's mind. As Hansen reported:

“Operation ANADYR was designed to suggest lower-level Soviet commanders—and Western spies—that the action was a strategic exercise in the far north of the USSR. Promoting the illusion, the troops that were called up for the Cuban expedition were told only that they were going to a cold region. Those needing more precise instructions, such as missile engineers, were informed that they would be taking ICBMs to a site on Novaya Zemlya, a large island in the Arctic where nuclear weapons had long been tested.” (Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 191.)

The *Maskirovka* deployment for the Cuban missiles was such a success that it even fooled the Soviet officers who were on board the ships that were being sent from all over Russia. A total of eight ships left from eight different Russian ports, four from the North Sea and four from the Black Sea. On board the ships, the same *Maskirovka* method was applied throughout the transit period. As Hansen reported:

“On board, the Soviets applied the same maskirovka measures that they had adopted when they first began to send weapons to Cuba. Packing crates or special shipping containers concealed and protected weapons carried as deck cargo. Certain telltale military equipment was boarded up with planks to make it look like the ship's superstructure. Even on-deck field kitchens were disguised. The Soviets shielded crated military hardware—such as missiles and launchers—with metal sheets to defeat infrared photography. They stored other combat and specialized equipment below, out of sight. Ordinary automobiles, trucks, tractors, and harvesters were placed on the top deck to convey the impression that only civilian and agricultural gear was being transported.” (James H. Hansen, [Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis.](#))

The secrecy of the transit period was so strict that even the Captains of the ships did not know their destination until they left port. Through the Black Sea passage of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, all of the soldiers were kept below

decks until they were at sea. And at sea, they were allowed to come out and exercise on the decks only at night. The voyages lasted about 20 days. The secrecy worked perfectly, even after the missiles had been unloaded in Cuba. As the designer of the ANADYR plan, Soviet Army High Command General Anatoly Ivanovich Gribkov stated about the success of the operation: “US intelligence discovered neither the true significance of the surge in Soviet shipping to Cuba nor the mission of our troops on the island until nearly all the men had come ashore and, still moving in large numbers only by night, had been deployed to their assigned positions.” (Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: US and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chicago, Berlin Tokyo, and Moscow edition, 1994.) The unloading of the missiles in Cuba also involved a lot of secrecy and the *Maskirovka* method accounted for every move to be precisely taken according to plan. As Hansen reported:

“Usually two or three days were required to unload a ship with military cargo, and maskirovka requirements invariably complicated the work. Equipment that had at least a superficial resemblance to agricultural machinery was unloaded in broad daylight, but weapons and other military equipment could be unloaded only at night. From the docks, specialized equipment was stored in sheds or moved directly to designated bases along back roads at night.

“All this time, Radio Moscow was claiming that the USSR was only giving Cuba ‘machine tools, wheat, and agricultural machinery,’ along with ‘some 7,000 tons of various fertilizers.’ This description was consistent with the false identities provided to many of the Soviet military specialists and also with the daytime unloading activity.” ([Ibidem](#))

According to Hansen, the measures of *Maskirovka* were not always secured. The reason for Hansen’s suspicion was because some of the measures were deliberately put out in a truthful manner. For example, the Soviet planners leaked accurate information that the CIA disregarded as deception, because the CIA expectation was deception. Hansen wrote:

“The planners leaked accurate information about the deployment so as to mask it. The information was funneled through counterrevolutionary organizations and their press in the United States, especially in Miami. The CIA discounted the information, because it did not consider the groups and people peddling it to be credible. This strategy was highly effective, according to a former Cuban intelligence officer.

“The deception campaign that exploited the émigrés' lack of credibility was unwittingly backstopped by correspondence between Cubans and their friends and relatives in the United States. From June to September, Cuban intelligence intercepted some 17,000 letters that had something to say about the deployment of Soviet troops and missiles in Cuba. In late September, Cuban authorities permitted those letters to arrive in Miami as part of the deception campaign. Just as Havana expected, the CIA paid no attention to these letters.”

This “deception” is very interesting, because it poses the question as to what the ultimate Soviet goal of the Missile Crisis was all about. Why hide the truth in plain sight? Was the Russian purpose like Edgar Allen Poe’s “Purloined Letter,” or was it for an opposite purpose; that is, for the secret to be found? What is the aim of teasing the mind with the truth, if not for the purpose of leading such a mind to a discovery of principle?

To most American minds, such news of Soviet troops and the presence of missiles in Cuba must have had the effect of appearing to be completely impossible and unbelievable. However, for a few others, the effect may well have been the opposite. Is there a way to know the difference? How can you know the difference? Who or what is to be trusted? How can any or all of these 17,000 letters, sent during a short period of three months, be trusted? What does that overwhelming mailing tell you in comparison with, say, the three previous months? Indeed, if you trust the report of this intelligence, and not your own intelligence, you are in real trouble. Americans are like children who need to grow up fast. And so, in October of 1962, the CIA, the Government, as well as the great majority of the American population found themselves in deep trouble.

The tipoff that let the cat out of the bag, however, came when the Soviet and Cuban officials made it known that operation ANADYR could not be kept secret on Cuban soil for more than a few weeks after they had arrived in Cuba, because the missile carriers were too big to go unnoticed on the back roads of the countryside. The carriers were so large that, in some places, they had to cut a whole series of telephone poles in order to get them through. As Hansen reported: “The missile sites themselves could never have remained hidden for long. They were constructed in areas expropriated from Cuban landowners, *had no fences or walls, and were exposed to aerial observation.*” [the emphasis is mine.] ([Ibidem](#))

Now, here is the rub for an alert mind. Why, after going to so much trouble to hide those missiles on ships, all the way from the Soviet Union to Cuba during at least 20 days, would the Soviets put them out in plain sight for anyone on the ground, or in the air, to photograph them? Ironically, the reader may wish to ask at this point, why it did not strike CIA operative Hansen, an expert in aerial reconnaissance photography, that the Soviets might have put the missile in plain sight for a definite purpose, and not because there was no place to hide them. Indeed, why would the Soviet Military, which had been so “preventive” up to that point, leave such a missile site out in the open without camouflage of any sort and leave a convoy of trucks in the middle of the road for any American spying airplane to identify in broad daylight, even with a Polaroid camera? (**Figure 9**) Look at the picture, here, and ask yourself: “Am I missing something here? Should I be looking for something hidden, here?”



Figure 9 U-2 aerial photographs of plain sight SS-4 missiles and truck convoy in San Cristobal, Cuba, on October 14, 1962.

The reason Hansen gave for the so-called lack of camouflage, i.e. lack of *Maskirovka*, was also very telling. He said:

“Standard maskirovka doctrine gave preference to deployment in wooded areas, yet Cuba's forests were generally sparse, consisting of a few clusters of palm trees or a thick undergrowth of bushes. Such vegetation could not cover all of the missile equipment. SS-4 launchers are anchored to large concrete slabs and surrounded not only by the missiles, but also by multiple buildings, fuel trucks and tanks, and hundreds of meters of thick cable. To try to maintain secrecy, Soviet commanders forbade their troops from taking any leave from their deployment sites and ruled out using Cuban

labor. Nonetheless, Soviet commanders and planners knew that although the tractor-trailers and associated large objects could be covered by canvas, their masses could not be shrunk. Heavy equipment might obscure part of the missile site signature from ground-level, but from above it stuck out markedly.” ([Ibidem](#))

Brilliant deduction! In other words, the Soviets had not been told and did not know, ahead of time, that there would be nowhere to hide oversized missiles in Cuba. Then, why did they go ahead with such an insane project? Are they completely stupid or what?

According to Hansen, only six minutes after the first U-2 aircraft photograph was taken, on October 14, 1962, the US Air Force spy plane snapped another 928 photographs that revealed the multiple arrays of Soviet missiles all over Cuban soil; and that was the confirmation the CIA needed to conclude that the Soviets were getting ready to attack the United States with nuclear weapons.

But wait a minute: Why would you show yourself in broad daylight if you were trying to launch a surprise attack on someone? Why was it that not a single missile was covered with camouflage netting or hidden under trees, while they had been completely hidden on the decks of the Soviet ships during the entire trip to Cuba? Hansen did not ask those questions. Why not? Why didn't his mind register anything about this sudden and complete lack of *Maskirovka*? Not a single CIA operative dared ask the question: “Why did the Soviet not use their *Maskirovka* method on Cuban soil? Why spend so much effort to hide missiles during 20 days only to leave them all out in the open on the 21st day? This is why, in the domain of intelligence, one must always pay attention to the intention.

What if all of those missiles had been put there for a different purpose than to attack the United States? What if the purpose had been to test American seriousness about their willingness to prevent the launching of a nuclear war, and show them that the Soviets were willing to sacrifice their own weapons in order to avoid such an eventuality? What if the deployment of those missiles had been an ultimate test of deterrence?” Americans may never know the answers to these questions, but every Russian soldier involved in operation ANADYR ultimately

did know the answers, because they had a lot of time to formulate them and discover the significance of such questions. Just by posing these questions it should be enough for the reader to realize that maybe, just maybe, this test of Russian counter-intelligence, and of courage, *might have been* the whole truth, and the only truth there was to know about the role of *Maskirovka* in the Cuban Missile Crisis; because, if anyone in the world had a better “preventive” intelligence capability than Americans had, they would also have to have a higher responsibility and resolve for winning the peace for the world.

4. NOTE ON THE 1962 KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV CORRESPONDENCE **(Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence during the Cuban Missile Crisis)**

Just to remind the reader who did not live through the dangerous days of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, it is crucial to understand that less than three months after he was inaugurated, J. F. Kennedy was trapped by neocons into launching an invasion of Cuba which failed miserably at the Bay of Pigs.

The failure consolidated the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union, which included a Cuban-Soviet agreement to provide nuclear missiles to Cuba. On October 14, 1962, an American U-2 spy plane photographed the sites of nuclear missiles that were left in plain sight for anyone to photograph. A week later, on October 23, close up shots of the nuclear devices and Soviet military installations were taken by regular American Naval flights over Cuba. **(Figure 10)**



Figure 10 October 23, 1962 US Naval photograph showing nuclear missile sites for everyone to see. Those nuclear weapons were obviously meant to be photographed. Why?

After studying closely those photographs, President Kennedy decided to form a National Security Committee called EXCOMM (Executive Committee of the National Security Council) which had the task of determining the course of action that the President of the United States should take. Five proposals were taken under consideration:

1. Do Nothing
2. Use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviets to remove the missiles

3. An air attack on the Missile sites
4. A full military invasion
5. A naval blockade of Cuba.

After considering his five options, Kennedy chose the option of a naval blockade of Cuba, but the term “blockade” was changed for “quarantine” because a blockade was an act of war. On October 22, 1962, Kennedy addressed the nation on television and announced that any nuclear attack by Cuba against the United States would “require a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” The following correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev was the result of that televised announcement. The following truthful correspondence between the two leaders is actually what prevented nuclear war.

In his letter of October 24, 1962, Khrushchev rejected the illegal “quarantine” of Cuba that Kennedy had ordered and called on Kennedy to abide by “the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters” or else expect “an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war.” Khrushchev wrote:

“You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one’s relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.” ([Khrushchev’s 24 October 1962 letter](#))

This response of Khrushchev to Kennedy’s sense of reason worked and Kennedy responded in kind. Realizing that Khrushchev did not want to have a nuclear war, on October 27, 1962, Kennedy changed his position and adopted the second of the five modes of action; that is, if the USSR was willing to remove the missiles from Cuba, he would cancel the “quarantine measures.” On October 26, 1962, Khrushchev replied to Kennedy:

[...] “Now we have already publicly exchanged our evaluations of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his understanding of these events. Consequently, I would judge that, apparently, a continuation of an exchange of opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, will hardly add anything to that which one side has already said to the other.

“I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, still more, Communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We, Communists, are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a game nor as a means for the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy and a calamity for all the peoples. [...]

“But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba can attack the United States and that even we together with Cuba can attack you from the territory of Cuba? Can you really think that way? How is it possible? We do not understand this. Has something so new appeared in military strategy that one can think that it is possible to attack thus. I say precisely attack, and not destroy, since barbarians, people who have lost their sense, destroy.

“I believe that you have no basis to think this way. You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you, you will respond the same way. But you too will receive the same that you hurl against us. And I think that you also understand this. My conversation with you in Vienna gives me the right to talk to you this way.

“This indicates that we are normal people, that we correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation. Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or

suicides, who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die, could do this. We, however, want to live and do not at all want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: To compete with your country on a peaceful basis. We quarrel with you, we have differences on ideological questions. But our view of the world consists in this, that ideological questions, as well as economic problems, should be solved not by military means, they must be solved on the basis of peaceful competition, i.e., as this is understood in capitalist society, on the basis of competition. We have proceeded and are proceeding from the fact that the peaceful co-existence of the two different social-political systems, now existing in the world, is necessary, that it is necessary to assure a stable peace. That is the sort of principle we hold.” ([Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962.](#))

The frank tone of Khrushchev’s remarks demonstrates that both leaders have already come to an agreement on stopping the crisis. Kennedy’s two page letter of October 27, 1962 in response is reproduced in full below:

“Washington, October 27, 1962, 8:05 p.m.

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

“I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

“Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this weekend--in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative--an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals--which seem generally acceptable as I understand them--are as follows:

“1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

“2) We, on our part, would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

“If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding 'other armaments', as proposed in your second letter which you made public./2/ I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

“But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines in this letter and in your letter of October 26th.

/s/ John F. Kennedy"

Rusk

[\(Kennedy's Reply to Chairman Khrushchev's Letter of October 26, 1962\)](#)

What Khrushchev said in his second letter of October 26, 1962 was sufficiently convincing for Kennedy to completely change his defensive attitude, which had been imposed on him by the likes of Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara, and come immediately into agreement with his Soviet counterpart on how to deal with Cuba.

On the other hand, Khrushchev's willingness not to provoke the quarantine and to immediately pull his missiles out of Cuba was the proof that the deployment of such weapons was for the purpose of deterrence and not designed as a first strike.

CONCLUSION

The war drive that Obama is waging on behalf of the British Empire is being derailed in the current tug of war that Europe is engaged in with the British Empire in order to avoid World War III. As the report from LaRouchePAC concluded on May 27, 2016:

“Whether Europe will be forced into another war, which could be the last, or whether it will join in the Eurasian development effort centered in, but much broader than China and Putin's Russia, is a subject of the most intense struggle in Europe at this moment. The growing refusal to submit to Obama's blackmail has been highlighted, just over the past few days, by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier's statements against the Russia sanctions policy, and his other statements in favor of Europe's embrace of the New Silk Road. Even more striking was the column by noted German historian and commentator Michael Stuermer in *Die Welt* on May 24, cited by Helga Zepp-LaRouche that day. Now, Stuermer is certainly no left-winger, and *Die Welt* is a conservative paper, but nevertheless Stuermer made the clear and resounding call: "There is No Protocol which Protects Us from Nuclear War Any Longer."

“These are days of decision, but they are numbered. No one knows the exact number, but the decisions will not wait.” (**These are Days of Decision for the World**)



Figure 11 Indian President Mukherjee with leaders of Russia, China, South Africa, Vietnam, Egypt during the Moscow Victory Day Parade, 9 May 2015. The United States chose not to participate. [source: kremlin.ru]

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