

From the desk of Pierre Beaudry

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# THE GEOMETRY OF THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA

by Pierre Beaudry, January 7, 2013.

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"The Mind of God, whose copy here on Earth is the human mind, that from which its archetype retains the imprint of the geometrical data from the very beginning of mankind."

#### Johannes Kepler

"Now, where's the problem? What's the defining line? Well, the defining line is what we call creativity, actual creativity, and most people just don't have it. It's taken out of them. But they're capable of responding to it under special conditions. It's like a kind of resonance. They have something of themselves left inside themselves, and under certain kinds of leadership, they can respond. And they can find and come in tune with this thing we call creativity."

#### Lyndon LaRouche

**Figure 1** Leonardo da Vinci *Knot Pattern*, ca. 1497-1500. The process of construction is based on the well-tempered quadratic series  $4 \times 8$  and  $2 \times 16 = 32$ . (Bibliotheca Ambrosiana, Milan, Italy)

## **FOREWORD:**


The *Thirty Years War* (1618-1648) and the current *British-Saudi fabricated War against Al-Qaeda* (2001-201?) are based on the same principle and have the same underlying *modus operandi*: They are both Imperialist Wars waged with the same intent for world economic domination, and they are both fought under the guise of a "War of Religion."

An overview of the geometry of the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> might help understand the strategic problem we face today, and help us devise a method for stopping the present war. The report has five sections:

THE THREE-MIND-PROBLEM-SOLVING-PROCESS OF THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA
HOW THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA WAS FORCED UPON THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE
THE AMAZING MAZARIN LETTER TO HIS NEGOTIATOR COMTE SERVIEN
HOW THE BRITISH EMPIRE SABOTAGED THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA
HOW AN AXIOMATIC CHANGE IS A SELF-FLANKING ACTION AT RIGHT-ANGLE

## **1. THE THREE-MIND-PROBLEM-SOLVING-PROCESS OF THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA**

Problem solving has been a puzzle for most people since the beginning of time. For instance, British imperialist, Thomas Hobbes, believed that every person has the right to everything in the world and, therefore, the greedy appetite of each and every one is justified in waging "*war of all against all.*" Such an infantile Leviathan principle only appears to be true because it seems to confirm that there has never been any time in the past when men did not wage war against one another. In fact, people who believe that silly principle are looking in the wrong direction in time and, therefore, cannot see that the future is what they should be looking into in order to put an end to war, permanently.



It took an extraordinary genius like Cardinal Gilles Mazarin a great deal of time and patience to discover a solution to this problem, and even after he applied his unique solution to the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> in 1648, the principle he had discovered was still not fundamentally understood, because people kept looking at the past instead of the future. Silly people simply thought the principle meant to forgive and forget the past. That is silly because forgiving and forgetting are not axiomatic changes in time. The point is to abandon your own self-interest and concentrate exclusively on the future interest of mankind. In other words, the idea is not mutual benefit between you and me, but your benefit and the benefit of mankind, exclusively.

Figure 2. Cardinal Gilles Mazarin (1602-1661)

The British oligarchy, for example, has explicitly rejected that solution to the problem of war, because they know it means the end of their imperialist power. And, they are right. That's what the Peace of Westphalia was meant to do: eliminate the empire in all of its forms. That, in fact, should be quite obvious, because imperialism is based fundamentally on the principle of *taking advantage of the other* as opposed to *giving the advantage to the other*. Permanent peace must start with the benefit of all of mankind, or else it's an empty shell.

An easy way to demonstrate how this principle works is to adopt the following triply-connected rule of conduct. Apply this principle and you will be able to solve the problem of war, permanently.

The problem consists simply in finding congruence among three minds, or three nations, that are in conflict with one another. In a nutshell, the Peace of Westphalia came about when Mazarin discovered a triple relationship whereby the intention of France had to force the Austrian Habsburg Empire into agreeing to give the advantage to the German Principalities. The concept is simple, but the application difficult. This is how Frederic Gauss defined that same congruence in his *Disquisitiones Arithmeticae*.

With respect to whole numbers, a congruent relationship must be such that any power of a number C, which is divisible by another number B which is prime to C, must produce a remainder number A, which changes all the time as the power of C increases through an unending process of continuing least-action within the dynamics of A, B, and C as a whole.

Imagine a strategic situation where, during the Thirty Years War, there were 16 German Principalities in alliance, or at war, with France and the Austrian Habsburg Empire. The alleged religious cause of the war is entirely irrelevant because the solution to the war has nothing to do with religion. Each and all of those German Principalities had to change in order to become congruent with France and the Habsburg Empire through the process of the lasting <u>Peace of Westphalia</u>. In other words, the congruence between France, Austria, and the German Principalities had to be based primarily on the benefit to the German Principalities and their ability to create, for and by themselves, a sovereign German nation-state.

Let France be C = 3; let the German Principalities be A, which is any number from 1 to 16; and let the Habsburg Empire be B = 17. The only number that never changes is B, the Empire. As France (C) increases its power of forcing congruence onto the Habsburg Empire (B), any division of C by B will produce a remainder (A), which must become congruent with B and C by eliminating the difference between them. The elimination of that difference is the axiomatic unity of action between the two dimensionalities of the torus which are expressed by the Toroidal action of B = 17 and the Poloidal action of C = 3 acting at right angle to each other. This process of congruence among human relations or among nations requires a unity principle of three rules of conduct.

1) When you have a conflicting situation between individual human beings, it is never the entities in themselves which are defective. It is *the process of intervals of action* that is disconnected or misconnected among them. If you reestablish the congruence properly among those entities understood as intervals of action, you will have peace and harmony. If not, you will have continuous conflicts.

2) When the connection is missing, the way to restore it is to establish a function that is *in congruence with three unequal Minds*, or three unequal political entities such as a Sovereign-Nation, an aspiring Sovereign-Nation, and an Empire.

3) Such a function generates a pathway of least-action that establishes congruence everywhere by flanking itself at a right angle. The way to establish that flanking action and eliminate all obstacles to peace *must be to establish the Advantage of the Other* as the dominating principle of conduct among any groups of three thinking individuals or three nations. (Figure 3)




Figure 3 Modular-wave-function of 3 (Mod 17). This modular process shows metaphorically how Mazarin solved the conflicts of the Thirty Years War. The braided twists of the torus represent the metaphorical process by means of which 16 German Principalities (A) established congruence between France (C) and the Austrian Habsburg Empire (B). The resolution of the conflicts is found by the non-linear intentional resonance of the whole process in such a way that the number of complete cycles of the entire torus corresponds to a total of C (B-1)/2 circumferences. In this case, 3(17-1)/2 = 24.

This synthetic geometric process can be apprehended easily by following the flow of each unit of action represented by the braided twists of this torus in a clockwise manner. If you are capable of creating a continuous least-action process around the torus in a manner such that you eliminate all obstacles created by the remainders **A** of the powers of **C** which are divided by **B** along the pathway, you will be able to cover all of the units of action represented by all of the strands of the knot in a continuous process of change, and obtain a total of **C** (**B-1**)/2 circumferences of the entire torus. The series reproduced at the top of the torus in **Figure 3** indicates the ordering sequence of how many waves have to be counted as intervals of action in order to solve each of the non-linear singularities of change that comes from 16 triply-connected conflicts between **A**, **B**, and **C**. How do you solve this problem in the real world? You cannot do it with ordinary arithmetic.

This geometric problem can only be solved if one discovers the proportionality of harmonic ordering behind the dynamics of the three minds involved; that is to say, the harmony between reason and power among the different forces they represent, which is the only possible way of solving strategic conflicts. For Mazarin, this was not a matter of conflicts between religions; this was a matter of thinking the relationship between reason and power *in situ*. As Leibniz developed in his <u>Outline of a Memorandum on Arts and Science</u>, if the wise wishes to stop a conflagration such as the Thirty Years War, he must strike a balance between what man is capable of doing and what he is capable of

understanding. There is no formula for this sort of dynamics, but there is a dynamic form of harmonic proportionality which depends on truthfulness alone. As Lyn demonstrated, this is how the mind is able to increase its energy-flux-density.

Take for example the case in which you wish to reach an understanding within a nation based on a government of the people, for the people, and by the people. That form of government expresses a balance between reason and power. However, if you weigh that idea against the power of an Imperial authority, like the Austrian Empire, you will inevitably end up in a Thirty Years War. Why? Because the power of that imperial authority was much greater that the understanding that existed among the parts that depended on it for their existence. As human reason develops, so must also develop the power of governing by reason. Otherwise, when reason and power are disproportioned, the result of the action always ends in tragedy. All of the Greek and Shakespearian tragedies exemplify this fact. If, on the other hand, you create among nations a balance between the governing power and the reason of the governed, you will have peace; otherwise you will have war. In other words, it is the imbalance between power and reason which is the ultimate source cause of war. As Leibniz demonstrated, when this dynamic is applied to individual human beings and the imbalance is in favor of reason, the person will be oppressed by his own impotence. On the other hand, when the imbalance is in favor of power, the person will become oppressive by becoming tyrannical. Neither of those two options is desirable, because both situations are detrimental to the peace of the world. As Leibniz put it:

"Thus hope and faith are founded on love, and all three on knowledge. Love is a joy of the mind arising out of contemplation of the beauty or excellence of another. All beauty consists in a harmony and proportion; the beauty of minds, or of creatures who possess reason, is a proportion between reason and power, which in this life is also the foundation of the justice, the order, and the merits and even the form of the Republic, that each may understand of what he is capable, and be capable of as much as he understands. If power is greater than reason, then the one who has that is either a simple sheep (in the case where he does not know how to use his power), or a wolf and a tyrant (in the case where he does not know how to use it well). If reason is greater than power, then he who has that is to be regarded as oppressed. Both are useless, indeed even harmful. If, then, the beauty of the mind lies in the proportionality between reason and power, then the beauty of the complete and infinite mind consists in an infinity of power as well as wisdom, and consequently the love of God, the highest good, consists in the incredible joy which one (even now present, without the beatific vision) draws out of the contemplation of that beauty or proportion which is the infinity of omnipotence and omniscience." (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, On the Establishment of A Society in Germany For the Promotion of the Arts and *Sciences*, Fidelio Magazine, Spring 1992.)

Such was the implicit underlying principle of harmonic proportionality that Mazarin established as the measure of the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u>, and that is the form of reasonable action that solved the most critical problem of strategic conflict in the history of warfare. The key, as I will now show you, was to eliminate the Empire's power of waging war against the weak. Neutralize the Emperor and you win everything else. As I will now demonstrate, this is the dynamics that Mazarin used to neutralize the Habsburg Emperor with the creation of the League of the Rhine.

#### 2. HOW THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA WAS FORCED UPON THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE

The ability to maintain the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> in Europe was not always straightforward. However, for Mazarin, war was not an alternative to peace. By 1648, there was no choice, there had to be peace, and for that purpose, Mazarin devised a negative form of the *Benefit of the Other*.

There was either going to be peace, or else there was going to be the application of a measure so fearful that such a peace would have to become certified most decisively by default. This alternative included a powerful incentive, delicate, dignified, but implacable, whereby, if the peace was not respected, the perpetrator who broke his engagement had to be made to worry more about defending his own personal interests than think about waging war.

This is what the French Ambassadors had to insinuate most emphatically to every interested party involved in the negotiation process, and more specifically, to the Emperor. In other words, the principle of benevolence implied that if a party refused to comply with the *Benefit of the Other*, he would be put to such a disadvantage that he would be made to fear more about his own annihilation than about disturbing his neighbor. This reason was put forward in defense of the weaker German States, and the mechanism that Mazarin chose was the creation of the League of the Rhine. The objective was to cause the Emperor to be isolated and made to fear more about his possible ruin than by losing a battle against any one of his neighbors.

This tactical epistemological warfare worked out as a sort of *negatively reinforced benevolent policy* where the lack of harm to the other became preferable to the consequences of personal disadvantages otherwise inflicted by war. From the vantage point of Mazarin, forcing the Emperor to disarm against the Protestant German Electors was the only true assurance of an enduring peace. The following tactical context illustrated the point.

One full year after the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia on October 24, 1648, the armies on all sides were still standing and, an agreement was signed on October 5, 1649, stipulating the terms for retreating of the troops. The agreement between France and Austria was finally signed in Nuremberg, on July 4, 1650; two years after the official Treaty had been signed. The agreement fixed the three periods in which the retirement of troops, the evacuation of fortresses, and the disarming of other locations were to be effective in May, July, and August of 1651. The troops were finally pulled out of the said areas three years after the signing of the Treaty.

Of all of the practical aspects of the Treatise of Westphalia, the disarmament policy was the most difficult part to implement, because the Emperor still refused to accept the inevitable reality that the Holy Roman Empire was no longer the central power of Europe. Although the very nature of the Treaty of Westphalia implied that such a central power had to be wiped out, the Emperor was stubbornly refusing to accept it. Furthermore, since the King of Spain had refused to sign the Treaty of Westphalia, and was still at war with France, the Emperor was seeking ways to maintain his army standing, in support of his relative, Philippe IV, even though the Emperor had pledged by the Treaty that he would not support Spain. The Emperor found a way to keep his army standing by sending his troops into Lorraine, beefing

up the army of Charles IV, the Duc de Lorraine, who had been fighting against France under the colors of the Austria.

Meanwhile, the tactical delays of the Emperor caused the Electors of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne to establish a Defensive Catholic League in Frankfort, on March 21, 1651. At the same time a Defensive Protestant League was also formed, bringing together the Duke of Brunswick, the Elector of Brandenburg, and the Landgrave of Hessen Cassel, at Hildesheim. Mazarin saw in those two leagues the benefit of opposing the Emperor, but also the danger of reviving religious rivalries.

However, since these peaceful Leagues were founded on the principle of Westphalia, it was not proper that they be divided, and therefore, should be united to defend each other. For that reason, Mazarin did not miss the opportunity to propose that France and Sweden enter into the affairs of Germany, on both the Catholic and Protestant sides, and asked for them to be admitted as guarantors of the peace. The Germans accepted and the League of the Rhine was created in August of 1658, permitting the German Principalities to conclude alliances among themselves without the permission of the Emperor. The League renewed its mandate several times until 1688. Thus, the League of the Rhine had established a proportional harmonic balance between reason and power.

As a result, the Emperor found himself completely isolated and, more than ever concerned with his own safety. The league of the Rhine had succeeded in enforcing the implacable peace by disarming the Emperor by means of *negative benevolence*.

## 3. THE AMAZING MAZARIN LETTER TO HIS NEGOTIATOR COMTE SERVIEN

The following letter is a confidential letter of August 14, 1648, sent by Mazarin to his most loyal friend and negotiator, Comte A. M. Servien, in Munster, during the last months of negotiations before the Treaty of Westphalia was signed on October 24, 1648.

The letter refutes entirely the repeated accusations that Mazarin did not wish to conclude the peace treaty and that he was amassing treasures for himself and his family located in Italy. It further insinuates that because the Fronde was already launching civil war inside of France, Mazarin was forced to conclude the negotiations rapidly and at a great disadvantage to France.

Thus, it came to be that the principle of the *Advantage of the other* of the Treaty of Westphalia was to become, for posterity, the most glorious action in the history of French diplomacy.

"To A. M. Servien,

Paris, August 14, 1648

"It is impossible that, in the present or at any time in the future, I should have more passion than I have ever had to conclude the peace; but it might just happen that this State [France] were to need it more now than she ever needed in the past. You know the truth of the first and you can foresee the truth of the second as well as I by reflecting on what has happened during the last few months inside of this kingdom.

"Thank God the union of the royal family has never been more solid than it is currently. Never have our affairs been in a more serene state, such that it should make us hope to win more advantages over our enemies, if they were to obstinately want to pursue this war, or should put this crown in better condition, should they finally resolve to make peace.

"However, I see and I cry tears of blood for, at the same time that the outside seems beautiful, the inside is extraordinarily deteriorated and, by some deplorable fatality, we are inflicting upon ourselves the very injury that our enemies have failed to bring upon us. There is practically no part of our body which is not infected, each day, by someone, from among the great, who believes he cannot gain consideration and improve his affairs unless there were trouble, and thus, begins to think that, by some underhanded disposition, he could take advantage of the conjuncture in order to demand anything, and make a claim on everything.

"The parliaments of the kingdom believe that, by imitating the one in Paris, they can undertake anything and can command, with impunity, everything they consider to be to their greatest advantage, and the underling companies dare monkey their superiors. We hear, from all sides, all sorts of disobedience and excesses committed against the King's Farmers, and against those who are in charge of collecting the tax money.

"The people are beginning to taste the sweet but false hopes that were given to them maliciously into thinking that they would practically pay nothing, and so, the cure for that ill could not be anything else but the violence, sometimes worse than the disease itself. The wellintentioned are very few, and are not very useful; the ill-intentioned have all the means of spreading their venom and their bad advice, because they find themselves useful to those who receive them; and while I am killing myself working relentlessly, night and day, for the greatness of this crown, and for the particular happiness of each Frenchman, all those who are the enemies of the State, have a hatred of me because I have not had the goodness of letting myself be overwhelmed by them.

"Since my enemies can see that I have no place of asylum for myself, no charges, no government function, no duchy, no property, no land, from which I might have profited, nor have I enriched any relatives of mine, during the eighteen years that I have been at the service of France, and the six years that I have been Prime Minister; since all of my relatives are living in Rome, as they did forty years ago (what I am telling you in passing, because you are one of my best friends, is not to be told to anyone; but I remain hopeful that this conduct might merit some applause after my death, unless I might possibly get into some obligation, in which case you would be the first to council me not to have so much moderation, and advise me to do it for the sake of the kingdom itself), as I said, since they realize that they cannot get me on these counts, they have the malice of spreading among the people the lies that I have gathered treasures and have shipped them to Italy, while, in fact, and without any exaggeration whatsoever, I have to borrow money all the time in order to make a living, and keep up my house.

"There is no evil that they have not invented against me, in order to make me hateful before the eyes of the people, who are letting themselves easily be impressed by skin deep arguments, and especially by the fact that I am a foreigner. God grants that all of the French people may have the same passion as mine for the good of the State! I am writing all of this with a perfect serenity of mind, and I forgive with all my heart those who wish me wrong; having no other worry, or displeasure, than that which causes a failure in the extreme passion that I have for the good of the State, and that I sometimes see in the French themselves, while God continues to shower us with his bounties.

"Moreover, it is a sort of miracle that the affairs of the State can go forward with such prosperity in the midst of so many obstacles that we have forged against ourselves; but prudence dictates that we should not let ourselves be entirely convinced that such a miracle is to go on for long: all of the credit is exhausted; the sources of money are dried up and all of the purses are closed. It is not as if things had deteriorated to the point that we could not turn the whole situation around in an instant. The resolutions that we have taken to force everybody to accomplish his duty, and especially the parliament of Paris, if it were to emancipate itself after having heard the declarations and the decision of the King, could produce this result quite easily.

"The purpose of this discourse is to make you see the necessity of having to win the peace as soon as possible, and that, to achieve it, as long as solid and essential things are well established, we shall not require, from now on, to worry so much about the others. Like I said, it is not the enemy who worries me; because it seems that we could reduce them to the worse state that they have ever been in, and even to the point where they could not even recover, but it is the French themselves who give me such apprehension, and being indifferent to their prosperity they are conducting themselves as if all they wanted was disorder at all cost.

"Thus, we can say that, before the parliament which is responsible for all of this commotion, the King will be forced to a disadvantage in the Peace, because his Majesty will be forced to cede things that we might have otherwise gained, had everybody conducted themselves in accordance with their duty..." (Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin pendant son ministère, publiées par M.A. Chéruel, Tome III, Janvier 1648 -- Décembre 1650, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1883, p.173-176. Translation by P.B.)

The Principle of the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> has often been misconstrued as meaning, "forget and forgive," "mutual benefits" between neighbors, or even returning to the "status quo ante." Those compromises are not principles; they are diplomatic blackmailing means of going along to get along. The peace was not based on "if you do this for me I will do this for you in return." Such compromises all come short of the truth respecting the axiomatic nature represented by the principle of the advantage and benefit of the other. This axiomatic principle of agape meant that the advantage had to be given to the other religion, that is, to the Protestants; because the only way that a durable peace could be achieved was for the Catholic forces of France and Germany to be assured that peace meant economic development and sovereignty for the German Protestant States and Principalities. No other form of peace was feasible or durable. The irony, however, was that the axiomatic feature of this peace had been introduced by Pope Urbain VIII, through the good services of Cardinal Bentivoglio.



Such a principle had been taught to Mazarin by Cardinal Guido Bentivoglio, who had been an associate of Pope Paul V, and Pope Urbain VIII, when he was first deployed in the Netherlands, and later in France. The Cardinal descended from the same Bentivoglio family that had been deprived of their lands by the Ultramontane Warrior-Pope, Jules II, during the Renaissance. The Cardinal's deployment to France was aimed at neutralizing the Venetian-Jesuit influence on Louis XIII, during the Thirty Years War. Louis XIII and all of his children had Jesuit confessors. One of those Jesuit confessors, Father Arnaud S. J. was kicked out of the King's household for having attempted to get Louis XIII to repudiate the Edict of Nantes.

Figure 4 Cardinal Guido Bentivoglio (1579-1644)

As I reported in a previous report on <u>The Tragic Paradoxes of the Thirty Years War</u>, Bentivoglio's brand of diplomacy had been based on patience, tolerance, and the benefit of the other. His general policy was to avoid everything that was offensive, as he was seeking peace in every conflict, and was constantly attempting to conciliate everyone with their enemies. He was always willing to even accept defeat in order to better disarm his opponents and bring them to a peaceful agreement. As he put it: « My services are the more successful when they are least suspected. » (Bentivoglio Cardinal G. <u>Lettres</u> <u>diplomatiques</u> and <u>Mémoires</u>.)

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Bentivoglio was first nominated Papal Nuncio to the Netherland by Pope Paul V, who had been the sworn enemy of Paolo Sarpi. In 1600, It was Paul V who excommunicated the Doge, the Senate, and the entire Government of Venice in, including Sarpi. From 1616 to 1621, Bentivoglio became Papal Nuncio to Louis XIII of France, as the Ambassador from the Vatican. He was considered the emissary of peace between France and the Vatican.

It was during the 1630 siege of the Italian town of Casal that a young 28 year old Sicilian, Giulio Mazarino, was personally chosen by Cardinal Bentivoglio for the purpose of negotiating a peace between the warring Italian parties. This was Mazarin's first success with the principle of benevolence. Four years later, Bentivoglio was nominated vice-legate to Avignon, and his work with the papacy got him to be chosen as the successor to Urban VIII by the humanist faction of the papacy. In 1639, the humanist Pope Urbain VIII sent Mazarin to become Minister to Louis XIII under the recommendation of Bentivoglio in order to establish a peace based on the *advantage of the other*, but, when Urbain died, in 1644, Cardinal Bentivoglio was also found dead under suspicious circumstances during the conclave. Bentivoglio's death led to the Ultramontane-Integrist candidate, Innocent X, to be elected as the anti-Peace of Westphalia Pope. That is how the *advantage of the other* was introduced in the Thirty Years War by Cardinal Bentivoglio.

## 4. HOW THE BRITISH EMPIRE SABOTAGED THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA.

In order to better understand the complexity of the task that Cardinal Gilles Mazarin had undertaken for the purpose of securing the peace of Europe in 1648, one must internalize certain ironies of his diplomatic *analysis situs*, and consider them in light of the three main paradoxes of the three main contenders of the Thirty Years War, the German Principalities (A), the Austrian Empire (B), and the French (C). As I have reported before, the three main problems that defined the strategic situation of Europe at that time were represented by the French, the German, and the Austrian paradoxes:

- The French paradox, or the Mazarin paradox, can be stated as follows: "France cannot win the war against the Habsburg Empire unless the German Electors join the French forces at the negotiating table, but this cannot be done unless France, a Catholic nation, sacrifices her own self-interest for the benefit and the advantage of the Protestants."
- The German paradox of the German Principalities was best expressed by the Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William, who formulated his own personal situation when he wrote to Mazarin: *"I agree with your principle of the advantage of the other, but, if I apply it to myself, I will be killed."*
- The Austrian Habsburg Empire paradox is best represented by the Emperor's view of General Albert Wallenstein. The paradox was: "Either the Emperor restores Wallenstein as the Commander in Chief of his armies and the Emperor loses his authority, or, he does not restore the Wallenstein unity of command, and Austria loses the war." (Paradoxes of the Thirty Years War)

The official process of negotiation lasted six years, from 1642 until 1648, and reflected extremely complex series of knots between any three or more elements engaged in the war which would be impossible to replicate here for the lack of written accounts of the meetings that were held both in Munster for the Catholics and in Osnabrück for the Protestants. Suffices to say, here, that each of the problems was resolved *in situ* by a well-trained French negotiator under the personal guidance of Mazarin.

A century later, similar paradoxes emerged between France, Austria, and Great Britain, but in modified ways. For example, French historian, Albert Sorel, identified the situation between France and Austria: "The direct causes of rivalry had dissipated, but the antagonisms of intentions subsisted." (*Recueil des Instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France*, Autriche, Felix Alcan Éditeur, Paris, 1884, p. 30.) The British, on the other hand, intended to increase their power over Europe by weakening those of France and Austria. This is an important point to understand, because the success or failure of the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> depends essentially on the question of the *intention resonance* among nations.

There were two very simple sets of political intentions that divided the three nations: *either giving or taking advantage of others*. Those are the only two options of historical *intention resonance* in any human relation. There may be a lot of ambiguous historical situations where taking is giving and

giving is taking, but for all intent and purposes, all social human actions always come back to those two intentions throughout history.

Take the example of how the British Empire was built during the Seven Years War (1756-1763). The British had acquired a most favorable position of control on the commerce of the seas, and as a result, they created their Empire under the guise of the British East India Company. The critical turning point that made this situation favorable to the British Empire had been reached with the outcome of the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756 that triggered the war. It would be too cumbersome to go into all of the details of this change in policy at this time, but the main highlights should suffice to identify the historical specificity of that crucial turning point.

On the one hand, in 1756, three European forces, notably, France, Austria, and Prussia, were emerging as contending forces on the continent, and the recently formed British Venetian Party was looking for ways to weaken all three forces by resorting to every possible means of entanglement of conflicts among those three powers. While their diplomatic interactions reflected a possible renewal of the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> that might include America in the process, the three European powers were also marred in potential conflicts of interests that the British intended to take full advantage of.

On the other hand, the intermarriages among the three courts of France, Austria, and Spain were made precisely for the purpose of maintaining a semblance of unity around the conditions of the Treaty of Westphalia, including maintaining the advantages to the "little States" within their political system. For instance, in 1760, in the middle of the Seven Years War, the three houses of Austria, Spain, and France decided to enter into a "family pact" with the marriage of Joseph II to Marie-Isabelle, daughter of Philip of Parma, the Infante of Spain, who, in turn married Louise Elisabeth of France, the eldest daughter of Louis XV. This was the beginning of an attempt to consolidate their power over Europe, which was soon to be followed with a third "family pact," ten years later, with the grandson of Louis XV, Louis XVI, marrying the sister of Joseph II, Marie Antoinette, in 1770.

However convenient these family arrangements between the three courts may have been, it was not sufficient to secure the intention and guarantee the continuity of the strategic alliance of the <u>Peace of</u> <u>Westphalia</u>. There were several serious flaws in the political system of the time, and the British were preparing a storm to take advantage of those weaknesses.

First of all, on the side of the Habsburg Empire, the young Emperor, Joseph II, was ambitious and sought to subjugate the little German States, with an additional eye on Poland. He refused to adopt the political system of peace that his mother, Empress Marie-Therese, had already adopted in the hope of guaranteeing a permanent tranquility of Europe. The "family pact" uniting France with Spain and Austria had eliminated the rivalries but the imperial intention toward the weaker States of Europe had not changed. That family tie did not reflect the selfless generosity that Minister Gravier de Vergennes was working from in order to keep the Westphalia Treaty system intact. Secondly, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Prince Kaunitz, was promoting an alliance with France and Russia against Prussia that he considered the most dangerous enemy of Austria.

Here was the essential crux of the shortcomings in this historical period. 1756 became the crucial turning point. First, Kaunitz was the leading force behind the defensive alliance between France and Austria, but at the same time, Joseph II also had him sign a Treaty of mutual assistance with Russia

against Prussia. This situation appealed to the British as a golden opportunity to force France into changing its defensive alliance with Austria into an offensive alliance against Prussia.

Since these agreements were of considerable advantage to the British as well as unbearable temptations for Austrian expanding intentions, the result was a complete subversion of the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> agreement. This whole operation was successfully manipulated by the British who were looking to start a war with France, and they got it. The Seven Years War (1754-1763) was going to become the decisive turning point for the entire world by throwing out the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> principle and creating a new European Empire, the British Empire.

After the British fleet had seized 300 French ships in total violation of international law, on January 16, 1756, Great Britain signed a treaty of "neutrality" with Prussia a few months later, and Frederick II was suckered into abandoning his alliance with France which had been consolidated only ten years earlier, during the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748). The new danger on the European horizon was no longer the Habsburg Empire, but Great Britain, which had succeeded in creating that reversal of alliance between Prussia and France. This was the strategic turn of event that led Austria and France to sign a first defensive Treaty of Versailles on 1 May, 1756, and a Second Treaty of Versailles



one year later, on 1 May 1757, which established a Franco-Austrian Alliance that would last over thirty years until the French Revolution.

Thus, the British had created a complete reversal of the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u>. They had turned the political alliances of Europe up-side down. What the British caused to occur was to change the adversarial pattern of alliances between four major European forces. The situation of Britain and Austria against France and Prussia during the 1740's became Britain and Prussia against France and Austria in the 1750's. This was the decisive moment that the British chose to increase the power of Prussia for the purpose of weakening Austria and curbing French Power. This is how the British started to fuel the flames of revanchism between the Germans and the French, a fire that will consume Europe up until the two World Wars of the Twentieth Century.

Figure 5 Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes (1719-1787)

As a result of that reversal of alliances, otherwise known as the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756, France lost Canada and its Asian colonies to Great Britain which became the new Empire under the guise of the British East India Company at the Treaty of Paris of 1763.

During the 1770's, the idea of the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> was barely remembered and the only remnant of the Mazarin legacy was found in the diplomacy of the French Foreign Minister, Comte

Charles Gravier De Vergennes, who readopted the principle of the *advantage of the other*, and reapplied it not only to the European theater, but also to the American Colonies as was demonstrated by the participation of France in the American War of Independence. In other words, America would still be a British colony today if it had not been for Vergennes's <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> intervention.

By March of 1777, Vergennes sensed a slight tremor that began to be felt in the alliance between France and Austria. The resonance was triggered by an excitement in the external behavior of the Prince of Kaunitz, who had become the Austrian Ambassador to Paris. Kaunitz was generally apathetic and vain, but his emotions began to confirm the activity of a sentiment that was not only opposed to his normal character, but most emphatically opposed to the peace understanding established between the two nations since the <u>Treaty of Westphalia</u>.

The troubled *intentional resonance* seemed to come from a new imperial expansion plan, this time, from the initiative of Russia. Prince of Kaunitz could not dissimulate the fact that he was disturbed about the prospect of an invasion of the Ottoman Empire by Russia, or an occupation of one of its provinces by a satrapy, and was intimating to Vergennes, that although such an action might not significantly decrease the rapprochement between Austria and Russia, it would, nonetheless, increase dangerously the ties between Russia and Prussia.

This is the type of three-mind congruence that Gauss will later become very familiar with in **Disquisitiones Arithmeticae**, and that Mazarin had previously adopted in order to solve all manner of awkward situations *in situ*, during the war. In the last six years of the Thirty-Years War, Mazarin's diplomats had all been well trained in the fine art of reading the body language of the people they had to dialogue with, and had to bring into an axiomatic process of change. The issue was not to influence people, but to change them. And if people refused to change, Mazarin made them painfully aware that he was willing to use more convincing methods, if necessary.

This tremor of ambiguity in the character of Kaunitz was the germ of an idea that began to excite the vigilance of Vergennes, since the political system of France was, at that time, irreconcilable with the political system of Russia, as long as the latter kept working to destabilize the North of Europe and to enervate the Ottoman Empire on Europe's Eastern flank. On March 2, 1777, Vergennes wrote the following instruction to his newly chosen Ambassador to Vienna, Baron de Breteuil:

"We may presume that the court of Vienna has given us the true key to her policy when she disclosed her sentiments about the Prussian monarchy, and the expectation she is in with respect to the establishment of the Oriental Empire in causing a tightening of the ties which subsist between the courts of Berlin and that of Saint-Petersburg.

"The Prince of Kaunitz appears to sense that a liaison, which, in the present state of affairs, seems to be forced and counter to nature, and which seems to be only the product of a personal seduction, and a combination contrary to the most evident interests of the two States, but which might turn into a true political union, natural and in a sort of way as much necessary as dangerous." (Albert Sorel, Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France depuis les Traites de Westphalie jusqu'a la révolution française, Felix Alcan Éditeur, Paris, 1884, p. 506.)



Thus, the germ of Kaunitz's fear grew into a potentially deadly virus that began to infect the political fabric of the Franco-Austrian alliance. Here, it is essential to understand that what was at stake, in this unique European alliance, over more than a century, was the closely interwoven systems of the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> that France had finally been able to patiently restore after the death of Louis XIV, regardless of the stupidity of the royal families and their court ministers on both sides of the equation.

**Figure 6** Louis Charles Auguste Le Tonnelier, baron de Breteuil (1730-1807)

The instructions of the Ambassadors of France to Vienna were joined by an invisible thread, always present in their dispatches, which tied the different knots of interests of the European States with the mission of a single French national interest which was *to protect the sovereignty and the security of all German Principalities for their own sovereign benefits*. As Sorel put it: "If maintaining the Treaty of Westphalia was one of the French stipulations, it also had to become one of its effects. France shall continue to defend the little States against the covetousness of the big States." (Albert Sorel, Op Cit., p. 29.)

Vergennes reported to Breteuil that Kaunitz would not genuinely get so excited unless the new political shift of Russia were caused by something important, yet "we do not see any other reasons and



none more powerful than those which were indicated," said Vergennes. Then and there, Vergennes saw a dangerous dark cloud beginning to form over the newly recovered <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> principle. He feared that new seeds of imperialism were beginning to grow in Russia by the fact Catherine the Great had increased her confidence in the hope that she could have significant influence over the European theater. However, Vergennes had misread Catherine's intentions through the masquerade of Kaunitz.

The irony was that Catherine never had real imperialist views over Europe and her Pact of Armed Neutrality with the American colonies was there to prove it. All that Catherine the Great intended to do was to pursue the same policy as Peter the Great whose intention was to modernize Russia on the model of Western European lines.

**Figure 7** Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz (1711 – 1794)

## 5. HOW AN AXIOMATIC CHANGE IS A SELF-FLANKING ACTION AT RIGHT-ANGLE

The key point to understand with the intervention of the British against the geometry of the <u>Peace</u> of <u>Westphalia</u> is that they created a false revolution which did not change the war manifold they started from. One of the most important aspects of an axiomatic change, such as the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u>, is that the action of change takes place as a flank at right angle to the form of action of the lower predecessor manifold, thus creating higher energy-flux-density. Furthermore, once such an axiomatic change is accomplished, there is no turning back to the previous state of existence. You may sabotage the process, but you cannot destroy it. This is what happened with the British Diplomatic Revolution of 1756.

To an observer living in the lower manifold, the flanking action appears to be a straight line action perpendicular to the axis of the whole process. However, for someone living in the higher manifold who is coming from outside of the proverbial box, the process of change is not caused by two separate actions coming at each other at right angle, as if in the intersection of two straight lines. The process of change comes from a doubly-connected rotating action acting at right angle to itself and coming from the future. In other words, the change was made from simple circular action to a doubly-connected toroidal action. Such was the historical *intentional resonance* of the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u>.

Again, examine the key feature of the Diplomatic Inversion of the 1756 strategic situation of Europe. The British wanted to change the balance of power by destroying the <u>Peace of Westphalia</u> arrangement; that is, by reducing the power of France and Austria in the process, set up Prussia as a new anti-French warlord on the continent, and become a new Empire. Those were the British motives behind the Seven Years War.

However, the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756 did not really change anything, because it was not a true revolution. The British caused an inversion of the partners in warfare as opposed to an inversion from warfare to peace. As a result, they created an inversion from within the manifold without changing that manifold. The quadratic arrangement between the four powers merely changed alliances from Britain and Austria against Prussia and France to Britain and Prussia against Austria and France. This quadratic diplomatic inversion maintained the axiomatics of war instead of creating a new axiomatics of peace, and the changes that took place were merely meant to improve the British position with respect to Austria and France. As a result, Austria lost to Prussia which, embolden by the British, became the mortal enemy of France for the next two hundred years. Such was the consequence of not making an axiomatic change at right angle by changing to a higher manifold.

Look at the same process in the different context of a plasma universe, and take the zeta-pinch singularity as the decisive right angle action inside of a plasma experiment. What does the zeta-pinch do? The pinch creates instability at right angle to the whole system, which has the effect of creating a powerful surge of heat energy throughout the plasma. As Winston Bostick put it: "when you shock the plasma on the same time scale on which the stability is lost, the pinch is heated."

This sort of axiomatic change has to occur like a bolt of lightning inside of your mind, when you realize that the pinch-effect generates an amount of heat that is equal to the power of the entire force of your mind or to the power of the entire magnetic field the plasma is generated from. The result of the

action at right angle to itself produces an increase of energy-flux-density for the whole system. However, that increase in power is not of the power you had before; it is a new power that you now have to increase the effectiveness of you previous powers. In other words, your increase in power is located in your power to increase your mastery over the universe from the top down. In this manner, every aspect of your past is changed and nothing is the same, because what has changed is the power to change. A similar pinch-density action is what takes place in Beethoven's Piano Sonata, Opus 27, especially as you go through the phase change of the third movement at measures 164 to 167.




Figure 8 Beethoven's Piano Sonata Opus 27, Third Movement, measures 164-167.

Thus, this self-flanking action of axiomatic change pertains to a historical form of universal *intentional resonance*. The best examples of historical *intentional resonances* are found in the domain of ideas and in the domain of classical artistic composition more specifically. For instance, the metaphor of Plato's Cave is such an idea which has found a revolutionary *intentional resonance* in Pierre de Fermat's least action principle of light refraction and in Louis De Broglie's pilot-wave of a quantum particle, as it is expressed in a double slit-experiment. In the musical domain, one of the best examples of *intentional resonance* is expressed by the transformation of Bach's <u>Musical Offering Ricercar</u> theme through Mozart's Fantasy Sonata K. 475, and Beethoven's Late Quartets, Opus 111, as Lyn indicated. In other words, *intentional resonance* leads to higher metastable new states of existence that are non-entropic, and which contain within themselves their own inherent memory of universal progress.