

From the desk of Pierre Beaudry



GABRIEL HANOTAUX AND THE HISTORICAL MISSION OF FRANCE



by Pierre Beaudry, 5/26/2008

**PART II
1890-1914**

9. FACHODA: COLONIZATION VERSUS COLONIALISM.

The issue of Fachoda was not a French colonial issue, per se, nor was it the colonizing issue relative to the African railroad, as such. The issue was who was going to win the fight: the republican American system or the oligarchical British Dutch Liberal system? That same question confronts humanity today.



Figure 10. Captain Alfred Dreyfus

On October 15, 1894, when the body of assassinated President Carnot was still warm, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish Artillery officer born in Alsace, was wrongly accused, and found guilty of spying for Germany. He was summarily dishonorably discharged, under the dubious government of Charles Dupuy, and was sent to Devil's Island to serve a life sentence. Gabriel Hanotaux and George Clemenceau were the only two government officials who went out of their way in attempting to obtain justice. Two years later, in 1896, it was finally Clemenceau who first publicly defended Dreyfus in his publication *L'Aurore*. A year later, on January 14, 1897, Emile Zola began to publish his own series of theses in defense of Dreyfus with his "*J'accuse*" (I accuse), which were originally serialized in Clemenceau's publication. President Emile Loubet set the record straight and rehabilitated Dreyfus on September 19, 1899.

After the failure of the Boulanger coup, the Dreyfus Affair had been concocted for the purpose of creating a revanchist awakening provoking an incident that would destabilize the remaining Carnot government, and lead to a new war between Germany and France. Such acts of destabilization showed how desperate the British and their monarchist assets in France were to stop the historical mission of France, and sabotage, particularly, the African colonizing program of Freycinet, Ferry, Carnot, and Hanotaux.

The point to be understood, here, is that, at the turn of the twentieth century, the term "colonial" did not have the same meaning in France as it

had in Great Britain. Several French governments during Hanotaux's lifetime, notably, under Jules Grevy, Jules Ferry, Charles de Freycinet, Sadi Carnot, and Jules Meline, were committed to the development of Africa. Hanotaux, himself, approached the matter with tremendous Promethean irony.

Following in the footsteps of the American system of republican nation building, the French government had introduced in world affairs a great ambiguity by creating an explicit distinction between colonialism and colonization; that is to say, by establishing an axiomatic difference between an American style colonization of Africa and British colonialism in Africa. This means that colonization implies the development of the colonized people, while colonialism excludes such a development. Therefore, such a distinction must also be understood to mean that British colonialism is nothing but a contaminated form of colonization; in other words, sophistry.

This was the only time, since the American Revolution, that a European nation had endorsed such an outright American policy of world development, and the whole thing was put under the guise of a "French Colonial Empire expansion." That form of "French Empire building" had even been endorsed by the humanist papacy of Leon XIII in Rome, and by the pope's right hand man in Africa, Cardinal Charles Lavigerie. Thus, Ferry, Carnot, Freycinet, Meline, and Hanotaux had put the fear of God into the British Empire, as well as in the royalist faction of the French oligarchy, who feared they were about to lose their colonial ascendancy altogether.

The policy was, in fact, a totally anti-British policy orientation and was attacked publicly as such by anglophile colonialist writers like, Gabriel Charmes, who violently criticized the Ferry policy in Africa by stating that "the capital error, the unforgivable error of the republican party, since it came to power, the error which has compromised its entire policy, is its rupture with Great Britain." (Fresnette Pisani-Ferry, *Jules Ferry et le partage du monde*, Paris Grasset, 1962, p. 257. Quoted from Gabriel Charmes, *La politique extérieure et coloniale de la France*, Paris, 1885.)

The French colonization policy intended to spark a worldwide economic renaissance based on an alliance for world development of railroads in collaboration among the United States, France, Germany, Russia, India, and China. The program also included a Ferdinand Lesseps railroad project for India that was to be connected with the African project in

Egypt. The irony of such a paradoxical “French imperial design” came across quite nicely in the following Hanotaux statement:

“People were frightened, by distance. So, the works undertaken by Cecil Rhodes in South Africa, by the British army of occupation towards Khartoum, by the Russians in Asia, - either trans-Caspian, or trans-Siberian - have given us, since then, conclusive examples. These lines “cover”, as they say, distances that are infinitely greater than those that separate the South Algerian outposts from the borders of our Colony of Sudan. These lines go through regions of similar deserted and extended regions, and we begin to understand that, for the railroad, distance is not an objection but, on the contrary, an argument (in its favor). In fact, distance becomes an invincible obstacle for domination and occupation, if it is not conquered by the railroad. [...] “Railroad suppresses the conquest. Everywhere the railroad penetrates, peace is established. [...] The Trans-Saharan railroad is, above all, a railroad of domination and of peace: an *imperial* railroad.” (Gabriel Hanotaux, *Fachoda*, Ernest Flammarion Editeur, Paris, 1909, p. 231-236.)

The irony piercing through Hanotaux’s underlying assumption is that it is the distance between people that the railroad conquers, not the people themselves. Transcontinental railways create a fundamental improvement in commercial exchange and a definite enhancement in the cultural development of the people whose lands the railroad goes through, which is the opposite of what the British policy produces by its “laissez-faire” economics.

The French approach of Lesseps in Panama, for example, was welcome in the Americas not as an imperial provocation against the Monroe Doctrine, but as an improvement in the American colonization process. According to a *New York Times* article of March 2, 1880, it was with such an intention that Reverend Dr. Storrs, pastor of the Brooklyn Congregational Church of the Pilgrims, had welcome Ferdinand de Lesseps to the United States in 1880, with the prospect of piercing the Panama Canal. Storrs, whose great grandfather was a puritan pastor in Washington’s army during the American Revolution, introduced Lesseps as a speaker to his meeting with the following words: “...Civilization has been doing, in other words, precisely what the Roman Empire did, when it flung out its great avenues to Gaul, to Spain, to the Lower Danube to the Straits of the Hellespont, to the

Cataracts of the Nile, only that American Civilization has been doing this, not for imperial aggrandizement, but for the multiplication of centers of wealth and power, for bringing nations to know each other better, for the advancement of liberty and peace and of the Christian faith.” (Reverend Dr. Storrs, *The Mission of De Lesseps. Achievements of Modern Times. Significance of the Task*, New York Times, March 2, 1880.) Like Lesseps and Hanotaux, Storrs believed that man was “destined by God to have dominion over the universe.”

In his book *Fachoda*, Hanotaux made it clear also that the French historical mission was entirely against mercantilist looting methods. Just like Roosevelt did, at the end of World War II, when he confronted Churchill by telling him that the United States would “*no longer use British nineteenth century methods*,” Hanotaux confronted the British and the French oligarchies by telling them he would *reject seventeenth century methods of looting*. This is what Hanotaux wrote in the spirit of the “advantage of the other” of the Peace of Westphalia. He wrote:

“In a contrary manner, the example of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries must teach us a lesson. After the encyclopedists, the Constituent Assembly denounced, with reason, the horrible *mercantilism* that had dishonored the first European colonization, and has left behind it, only a legacy of shame and of death. The fierce campaigns of the sixteenth century navigators, the thirst for gold, the hunting for blacks, all of the passions and all of the excited violences based on endless and futureless greed, have only resulted everywhere in ruin and devastation. Did those poor inferior races merit such a harsh treatment?

“The modern explorators have decided otherwise. Their work, which is now coming to an end, has ennobled, with its peaceful glory, the second half of the nineteenth century. It has, simultaneously, established the foundation of the modern African policy on the unshakable foundations of peace, humanity, and disinterestedness.” (Hanotaux, *Fachoda*, p. 63)

Note how, Hanotaux reintroduced in 1909 the same polemical question of developing “inferior races,” as did Jules Ferry at the National Assembly in 1884. However, that new thrust for the development of Africa was not going to succeed. That great project of Hanotaux was shattered by

the British Empire with the Fachoda incident of 1898, which Hanotaux was still calling, 11 years later, a “burning wound.”

In spite of this extraordinary British treachery, Hanotaux managed to find some diplomatic managements for England and without admonishing the British oligarchy for the false “entente cordiale” that the Fachoda event eventually led to, including World War I and World War II. In a way, and by some curious but truthful twist of historical fate, one might say that it took Two World Wars to prevent the development of Africa, and the British are in the middle of launching a Third World War to stop it again.

In a very poetic fashion, however, Hanotaux saw a way to solve the irreconcilable positions that France and England had taken in their rivalry over the partitioning of Africa. He saw the two rivals as “in the middle of these swamps, where the undecided waters of the two largest rivers of Africa hesitate before separating their courses,” Hanotaux made the forecast that “the policies which were rivals will come together and shall become united.” (*Fachoda*, p. 67.) Whatever may be the outcome of that future resolution of French-British rivalry, Hanotaux made the point that the future generations must know how history will judge it on nothing else but the truth. So, Hanotaux determined that the contaminated fog that was still covering this Fachoda conflict had finally to be lifted.

The official diplomatic story about this historical highpoint of confrontation between France and England is that the French wanted to build an East-West Trans-African railroad from Dakar to Djibouti, going through Fachoda, and the British wanted to build a North-South Trans-African railroad from Capetown to Cairo, which was also intended to pass through Fachoda. That was the story, and that is all that it was, a story. Why did the French and British not agree to unite their forces at Fachoda instead of using it as a conflict point? Why did Fachoda turn into such a tragic historical event? The reason is because the British call for a railroad from the Cape to Cairo was a lie. The project was nothing but an Alice in Fachodaland concoction served by British diplomacy for a gullible public. A railroad to the moon had more chance of being completed. But why would the British not build a Cape to Cairo railroad? Why did they choose to destroy the French railroad project, instead? What advantage does one really gain in having others at a disadvantage?

The truth of the matter is that the Fachoda conflict between the French and the British had nothing to do with railroads per se. It had nothing to do with commercial advantages. It was based on a matter of principle, and, as Lyn put it, again and again, the principle is the difference between man and animal. Are Africans going to remain backward and remain in slavery, or are they going to benefit from the bounties of Western European Civilization? When the contaminated fog of London is lifted, it becomes clear that the British model was to maintain colonialism; the French model was to introduce colonization. In concrete terms, the African choice of principle between France and Britain was between science or obscurantism, civilization or Dark Age, life or death.

So, in 1896, Leon Bourgeois, then French President of the Council and Minister of External Affairs, sent Captain Marchand on a mission from the French Congo to Fachoda in Sudan. The mission was not so much to conquer Fachoda, raise the flag in the name of France, and provoke an incident with the British. The French intention, which is generally misinterpreted as an act of conquest, was to force the British to the negotiating table. That part of the mission was successful. The region of Fachoda is a marshy area, which is part of the source basin of the Nile but also of the Ubangui-Congo River, north of the 5th degree of latitude, and which had been recognized since the 1885 Congress of Berlin as a French colony. Hanotaux related the historical circumstances of this French-British confrontation. He wrote:

“It is a self-evident fact that, historically speaking, any French colonial expansion was viewed in Britain as upsetting and worrisome. For a long time, Britain thought that, in terms of dominion over the seas, she had no other rival to consider except that of the power which had, as a gift of nature, a triple shore development of the Channel, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea. But, when, starting in 1880, circumstances were stimulated by the initiating genius of Jules Ferry, France began to undertake the reconstruction of its broken down colonial domain, she met with the same British resistance.

“In Egypt, in Tunisia, in Madagascar, in Indo-China, even in Congo, even in Polynesia, it is always Britain, which is in her face. [...] The colonial party, fired up with its initial success, was getting irritated by this opposition, which was always rising against its projects. An enervating agitation, - frankly useless, in any case – was

threatening the relationships of the two countries, from both sides of the Channel.

“At the same time, Britain was mobilizing...Its expansion policy into Africa began to take a character of unpredictable boldness; she had conceived of a triple project: posing as the inheritor of the Portuguese colonies, destroy the independence of the south-African republics, and settle down definitely in Egypt by taking over the Suez Canal.

“A conception, a gigantic formula, worthy of the active imagination characteristic of Shakespeare’s compatriots, put in a nutshell this prestigious project: “a railroad from the Cape to Cairo.” Africa was baptized “The Black Indies.” (*Fachoda*, p. 79-80.)

Indeed, it was the leader of the Liberal imperial faction of the British Liberal Party, Lord Rosebery, who had made the claim in 1895 that “the Master of India was also going to be the Master of Egypt.”

Hanotaux did not exaggerate at all in identifying how the British imperials were inflating themselves into a gigantic bubble over Africa. And France was the only European nation that could put a stop to the insatiable British lust for new colonies. In general, Hanotaux noted, how, during negotiations with Britain over African colonies, France had to give up ground, many times. However, in the case of Fachoda, “if France had given in one more time, the British victories would have taken over the whole universe by means of simple declarations.” (*Fachoda* p. 84.)

Thus, the British considered themselves the masters of Africa, and, especially of Egypt and the Nile Valley. For example, in March of 1895, when the Rosebery cabinet was asked what they would do if the French were to send an expedition to the Nile basin region from the French Congo, the British were incensed and acted as if they owned the entire place. Undersecretary of State at External Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, accused France of provoking an “unfriendly action.” However, after Foreign Affairs Minister, Lord Kimberly, saw fit to calm things down, it became clear that the British did not have any claim of possession at all over Fachoda, but only a “pretension” to claim possession over the Nile basin. After Lord Kimberly demonstrated that the British were willing to negotiate the matter, the issue became synallagmatic.

By 1897, the French Britain relations got so complicated and the British had made such a colonial push into Africa, both with Cecil Rhodes in the south and the Kitchener expedition as far as Khartoum in the north, that Paris despaired having any form of entente with London. A commission for the study of the border dispute in the basin of the Niger River and the Lake Chad region had been slowed down and could only be resumed again in November 1897, which, implicitly, included the negotiation of the Nile-Ubangui-Congo basin.

By then, the Marchand mission had not yet reached Fachoda, but the British were provoked by the news of his coming. The imperialist British Minister of Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, declared before the House of Commons: “Countries that Britain thought were her property have been invaded by surprise... We cannot accept such a situation. So, we have decided it was necessary to send border troops... The creation of this army is indispensable, whether the conflict with France has a satisfactory solution or not.” (*Fachoda*, p. 117.) This was meant to be almost a declaration of war, but it did force the British back to the negotiating table.

Hanotaux said that no French minister would have ever dared say anything like this, while in the middle of negotiations. But, “why were the British negotiating?” Asked Hanotaux: “Were they negotiating to amuse the carpets?” The British government was obviously negotiating out of bad faith, but, as a Minister of Foreign Affairs, under the Presidency of the reputed American protectionist, Jules Meline, Hanotaux was in a clear position to see the nature of the beast in action. However, he had no intention of raising some ill wind that would turn a mere fire into a conflagration. On November 26, 1897, Hanotaux personally intervened in the negotiations with British Ambassador to France, Sir Edmond Monson, in an attempt to invoke the “superior necessity of the entente.”

By December 10, Edmond Monson declared, “the Government of Her Majesty rejects the idea that some European power might have any sort of right to occupy a position, whatever it may be, in the valley of the Nile.” The imperialist *Pall Mall Gazette* heightened the confrontationist provocation by printing: “The Quai d’Orsay must be addressed from a tone of command.”

Hanotaux was shocked at the sudden build up of anti-French sentiment, as if the British government had been rallying public opinion for

a war. “Anyhow, we were not at that point,” thought Hanotaux. In any case, the danger appeared to be such that British undersecretary to the Colonies, Lord Selborne, threatened to break the alliance and prepare for war. In a corridor leading to the House of Lords, Selborne said to Lord Bradford, with the intent of being overheard: “Without doubt we wanted peace, but not peace at all cost. We have not waged war over Madagascar, because it would have been too costly: given the negligible importance of British interests involved there; but, can we say the same thing about East Africa?” This was disquieting for Hanotaux. The French would also use such measures as threatening rupture and speaking of war, but behind closed doors during difficult negotiations, and not with the press listening in. This was different. This was leaked to the media, like the *Saturday Review* and the *London Times*, for the purpose of shaping opinion.

By February 18, 1898, British Minister of Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, made a declaration before the Commons in which he announced that Britain was abandoning to the French the African territories of Mossi and Gourounsi in High Volta. That was quite a stunning surprise! Beware of British baring gifts. However, this only had the appearance of a happy moment of recognition that the French had been calling for the British to agree to all along. In reality, Hanotaux sensed that something was amiss and identified the moment as Britain’s “psychological hour.” Within the next four months the negotiations went rapidly to their conclusions without any difficulty. “This was very unusual”, thought Hanotaux. Amazingly, the British had gone from the threat of war to signing the convention of delimitation, which gave the French what they had been fighting for all along. But, why that sudden change?

Hanotaux reported:

“The convention of general delimitation which covered the whole of Africa in its breath, from Senegal to the Nile, was, finally, signed at the Quai d’Orsay, on June 14, 1898. British Ambassador, Sir Edmond Monson, was crying while signing his name to such a considerable act, the results of which he hoped would be the best for both countries. The next day, the Meline cabinet was toppled!”
(*Fachoda* p. 122.)

It seems that the British financial oligarchy had made the decision that it was less costly to topple the Meline government than to wage another

colonial war with France. Conclusion: the British are always willing to sign a treaty with France, especially when they know that the clauses of that treaty will be carried out by its agents inside of the French government. Thus, the next day, the Convention of June 1898 was barely noticed in Paris because a new pro-British government was being pulled together.

The Franco-British Convention of June 14, 1898 established a line of delimitation at between 21 and 23 degrees of longitude, located in the Ouadai Darfour region of Sudan and creating a barrier east of Lake Chad, leaving any possible railway project up in the air for future negotiations and a potential British control over the Chari River as the primary source of water to Lake Chad. (See **Figure 11**.) This is how the central banking cabal of London deals with French parliaments. And so, ended the efforts of Freycinet, Ferry, Carnot, Meline, and Hanotaux. The five pillars of France's American system policy had crumbled and Fachoda was the remains.

The incident of Fachoda was nothing but a diplomatic delaying action, a show of authority staged by the London bankers of the British East India Company aimed at confirming the terrible destiny of Africa a month after the signing of the convention and the fall of the Meline government. Marchand had reached Fachoda during the first days of July 1898. In June, Théophile Delcassé, the new anglophile Minister of External Affairs, had given the order for Captain Marchand to peacefully surrender Fachoda to Sir Herbert Kitchener who had sailed up the Nile south from Khartoum. Marchand got there just in time to hand over Fachoda to Kitchener. On July 20, 1898, the two commanding officers met and avoided any military confrontation. The news of the surrender came to Paris three months later on September 7, 1898. Meanwhile, the British and the Boulanger royalists had already celebrated their victory quietly in Paris and in London.




Figure 11. Gabriel Hanotaux’s map of the French African colonies at the conclusion of the Demarcation Convention of March 21, 1899.

However, on that day of infamy, humanity had suffered a setback that turned the clock of civilization back a thousand years. The darkest cloud of war began to cover the future of mankind one more time. The Trans-African railway was not built, and the sands of desertification continued to win, day by day, more and more of the African territory covering over more famine and more disease than ever before, all in the name of British “laissez-faire.” The following six years were dedicated to undoing what the French republican forces had built for the past 20 years, and the next target for the British to destroy became the French Third Republic itself. (See my report *French Government Archives on the Fascist Coups d’Etat of 1927, 1934, and 1940.*)

Finally, in 1904, as Hanotaux had forecast, the British and French waters became officially mixed together in their contaminated course. The newly chosen French Foreign Minister, Theophile Delcassé, and his British counterpart, Paul Cambon, signed their unified free trade policy into an

“entente cordiale.” Colonization turned back to colonialism, the marshes of Fachoda remained as unhealthy as before, and the British rushed in to open the flood gates to World War I. Today, Darfour must represent for the world, one more time, the opportunity to get rid of the current rotten British financial system of free trade in Africa, and bring back the Ferry colonizing policy. If we stop British free trade in Darfour, this time, we stop it worldwide.

10- THE FRENCH AFRICAN RAILROAD PROJECT

The failure of Fachoda did not stop Hanotaux. After leaving power in 1898, Hanotaux kept fighting and organizing for the African railroad projects, because the mission of France for the successful colonizing of Africa was still to be realized. The policy orientation was to pursue the Jules Ferry policy in the spirit of Charles de Freycinet’s reforms in both public health and public works.

In 1892, Freycinet was pursuing his work in collaboration with Hanotaux, both by criticizing the British colonial policy in Egypt, and by establishing a study commission on the colonization of Africa, of which Hanotaux was a member with the deputy of Oran, then undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Eugene Etienne. This became the advisory board to the government on matters of colonization. Jules Ferry often spoke at their meetings held regularly and presided by an industrialist M. Picard. The Secretary of the Commission, Paul Revoil, kept records of those meetings and also wrote reports on their projects. The writer-explorer, Henri Duveyrier, an expert on the Algerian and Tunisian Sahara as well as the barbaric Tuaregs, was also part of this commission.

Hanotaux suggested that an inquisitive investigator should put his hands on those important documents, which are to be found in the archives of the Ministry of the Colonies in Paris. He indicated: “The deliberations were lengthy, precise, matured. One day, a researcher will find in some corner, the proceedings of the commission meetings and the final report which concluded – like all commission reports – with a sense of expectation, by inviting the government to orient toward the South in order to initiate the future Trans-African railroad.” (*Fachoda*, p. 230.)

The initial railroads that Hanotaux had been promoting intended to not only unite the northern French African colonies of Senegal, Algeria, Tunisia, Chad, Niger, Sudan, but also Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and French Congo. In 1909, Hanotaux was considering three different projects for trans-African railway-lines. He elaborated them as follows:

1. “The Western project or Tunisian project of M. Bonnard: from Bizerte (Mediterranean), Bopugrara (Atlantic), Ghadames, Rhat, Bilma, Lake Chad, added to it when the time comes by the Sangha, on the Congo. [...] If a decision were to be taken for the construction of a “Trans-African,” that might be the one to be considered. It is true that it will be the most expensive, but it represents the considerable advantage of linking, at once, all of our African possessions. I will not discuss the objections. There are some that are of political nature. But, we must recognize that before choosing among the proposed routes, the Bizerte-Bopugrara-Chad-Congo project of M. Bonnard should be seriously considered.”
2. “A second project by M. G. Rolland, which began in 1890, would go from Biskra, through Ouargla, Ain-Guid, Assiout to Lake Chad, up until Kouka, which is entirely within our French territory. It is undoubtedly useful because, by following the traditional caravan route, it will carry the largest part of the Saharan traffic, without forgetting that of salt which, according to calculations, would be enough to cover the cost of maintaining the whole line.”
3. “Finally, the third route, the trans-Saharan, itself, which would link our outposts of South Oran to the ancient and future capital of French Sudan, that is to say, Timbuktu. This project represents the same benefits in the West that the project of Bougrara-Chad offers in the East. It definitely establishes and guarantees, once and for all, the boundaries of our domination. Thus, it becomes a precious auxiliary to our policy. Furthermore, it includes on its route these rich oases of Touat that form the most precious parts of the whole Sahara. Another considerable benefit is that it links together Senegal and Algeria by the shortest possible route. ” (*Fachoda*, pp. 232-33)

Hanotaux also responded to the objection of those who claimed that crossing deserts was not a profitable venture. However, Hanotaux replied that oceans were not profitable either, yet we cross regularly the oceans at a

great expense. Compared with the railroad, however, the traveling by locomotive through the different continents, as demonstrated by the studies of Freycinet, is less expensive than traveling to these continents by way of the vast oceans. The point, remarked Hanotaux, is that “we have to know if a railroad uniting our two great African colonies (Algeria and French Congo) represents a sufficient interest; so that the project can go ahead regardless of the fact that the desert route itself would not be profitable. That is the true question.” (*Fachoda*, p. 235.)

Moreover, the goodness of this project is not simply a matter of French public opinion and of French economic benefits. The project is good because it is for the benefit of the indigenous peoples of Africa. The railway system is necessary for the development of the African populations and for their integration into western civilization. What is good for Africa is good for Humanity. The political purpose is the generalization of the Peace of Westphalia, everywhere on the planet.

The British had rejected such a proposal because they were caught in a deadly paradox: If Africa were to be civilized and were to develop in accordance with American system methods of colonization, as the French plan represented, then, all of the British colonies around the world would wish to have the same advantages, and the free trade looting policy of the British Empire would be destroyed. However, on the other hand, if Africa were not to be brought to civilization, then, a profound Dark Age would fall upon the entire planet, and the free trade policy of the British Empire would also be destroyed. In other words, the British Empire cannot win!

11- THE SYNARCHIST MOTIVE FOR WORLD WAR I

Obviously, nobody would be stupid enough to blame World War I on Poincare or on Lloyd Georges. World War I was a big business proposition led by synarchist bankers, notably, the Bank of England and the Morgan Bank in the United States. John Kenneth Turner wrote an interesting note about this.

“In February, 1917, Representative Calloway, on the floor of Congress, charged the Morgan interests with having, in March, 1915, organized and financed a huge propaganda machine embracing twelve

influential publishers and 179 selected newspapers, for the purpose of manufacturing sentiment favorable to American participation in the war. These charges were renewed in May, 1921, by Representative Michelson of Illinois. The latter called attention to the fact that, in his history of the war, Gabriel Hanotaux tells of a conference with the late Robert Bacon, then a member of the Morgan firm, in 1914, in which he and Bacon drew up plans and specifications for a great scare campaign in this country. Hanotaux also suggests that France was ready to make peace in 1914, but was dissuaded by Bacon and other American politicians, who gave assurances that they could ultimately bring America into the war on the side of France. (John Kenneth Turner, *Shall it be again*, New York, B. W. Heusch, Inc., 1922.)

For Hanotaux, it was very clear that World War I was in direct continuation with the War of 1870, and he attempted to account for the presence of the British behind the scenes, using his fine diplomatic ironies. For example, in the opening page of the First Chapter of his *Histoire illustree de la guerre de 1914*, Hanotaux wrote these very insightful lines:

“ The War of 1914 is directly tied to the war of 1870. By consecrating, at the Treaty of Frankfort, the dismemberment of France, Bismark (who often protested he had done it against his own will) was leaving, in the bleeding wounded flank of this noble nation, the germ of future ills. He had no illusion on the subject, and he, himself, declared that it was a mistake to have made the claim of Metz and of the Lorraine.

“As early as August 13, 1871, he said to M. de Gabriac, Chargé d’affaire in Berlin: “I have no illusions; it would not be logical to have taken Metz from you, which is French, unless superior necessities had forced us to keep it...The High Command had declared : Metz is a bank behind which we can put a hundred thousand men. We therefore had to keep it. I will say the same about Alsace and Lorraine. *It was a mistake that we have made by taking them from you*, if ever peace were to last; because, for us, these provinces will represent trouble, etc.” (Gabriel Hanotaux, *Histoire illustrée de la guerre 1914*, Vol. 1, p.7. Highlighted in the original.)

I would add that because of this mistake, not only the French royalist forces of the Lotharingie had their revanchist policy ready made for them by

the British, but that the British also had the means of carrying out revenge at any opportune time they wished to trigger a new war between France and Germany. World War I became the opportunity to put the last nail in the coffin of the Peace of Westphalia.

Thus, as Hanotiaux noted, the whole political mission of this French team of the American system resided in this : “How to keep France appeased within this dismemberment.” And he further identified that, according to his own personal diplomatic sources, it was the British with the complicity of Helmut Charles Bernard Moltke who had forced the hand of Bismarck in taking Alsace and Lorraine. During a private conversation that took place in 1878, between the portraitist of Bismarck, Franz de Lenbach, and “an important personage of the period,” Hanotiaux reported on the following dialogue on the subject of a wrong evaluation by musician, Richard Wagner. According to Wagner:

“Bismarck has committed the worst and the most imbecilic crime of all... like a brute, abusing of war impudently, he has taken Strasbourg and Metz from France. For how many centuries to come did he open an abyss between two nations that need one another and which will now form the habit of hating each other instead of extending their hands to work together for the progress of mankind?

“Lenbach responded quickly: “Wagner is wrong. Bismarck did not wish to have the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to the German Empire; it was Moltke who imposed it in the name of military interests. Bismarck resisted as much as he could; he had to concede before the decree of the emperor. That is the whole truth.” [...] (Op. Cit., Vol I, 1929, p. 7.)

In a previous discussion that took place on May 10, 1875 between Bismarck and the Chancellor of Alexander II, Prince Alexander Gortschakov, Hanotiaux further revealed a similar dialogue between Bismarck and Gortschakov in which Bismarck, himself, identified the British as being the ones who “jumped in the back” of the French by surprise. Hanotiaux reported:

“Furious, Bismarck said to Gortschakov, approximately in the same terms that Emperor William used recently in addressing Georges V, ‘that it is not a policy of good friendship to jump without warning in the back of a friend who is trusting and suspects nothing...’ At the

same time, he was reproaching both Queen Victoria and British diplomacy “for having acted with duplicity in stating that they were convinced the intention of Germany was to break its relations.” (Op. Cit., Vol I, 1929, p. 8.)

The truth about the fact that World War I was caused by the British is further adduced by Hanotaux from the fact that after the 1879 Congress of Berlin, British Lord Beaconsfield pushed the Austro-Hungarian empire to grab the territories of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The British had succeeded in creating a second Alsace-Lorraine situation in the Balkans in which Germany was tied, once again, to the coattails of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Thus, Germany had been lured into a second trap laid by the British Empire’s game masters of so-called geopolitics. Again, according to Hanotaux, it was the Austro-Hungarian Comte of Aerenthal, imperial Ambassador to Saint-Petersbourg, who, upon becoming foreign minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, began to make plans that led inevitably to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Therefore, as Hanotaux considered, it was after the outstanding success of Moltke in Sadowa (Königgrätz), on July 8, 1866, that Germany had become a “prisoner of its own victory.” The Peace of Prague on August 23 expelled Austria from the German Federation and this led to the unification of Germany in 1871, with the domination of Prussia. However, Hanotaux estimated that the British used the newly formed German federation as a wedge to push the Austro-Hungarian monarchy eastward toward the Balkans, leading to an eventual conflict with Russia. The British were only too happy to help the Austro-Hungarians move for the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hanotaux emphasizes, however, that Prussia no longer had its own independent policy, but had entered into another form of dependency vis a vis the Austro-Hungarian Empire, thanks to the British.

As for Bismarck, Hanotaux understood that he had played an appeasement card, similar to that of Carnot, by attempting to create an equilibrium between an Austro-German alliance and a Franco-Russian alliance and keeping the British out of the equation. In a letter to the King of Bavaria, Bismarck wrote: “If the united forces between Germany and Austria had the same cohesion and the same unity of command as those of France and Russia, I would not consider the simultaneous aggression of our two neighbors as a death threat, even if Italy were part of our alliance...”

Then Bismarck added: “As an ally of Austria, the German empire would not miss the support of England...” (Hanotaux, Op. Cit., Vol. I, 1915, p.16)

Thus, it is clear that Bismarck was doing everything in his power to prevent England from throwing out of kilter this balanced equation. “The intervention of England would have been his nightmare”, wrote Hanotaux, “and he would have done everything to prevent it.” According to Hanotaux, the Triple alliance Germany-Austria-Italy was for Bismarck a precaution against both England and Russia.

Then, in 1884, Bismarck signed a treaty of reciprocal neutrality with Russia, “in case one of them were to be attacked by a third party.” This was what Bismarck called “contracts of re-assurance.” However, the engagement was only for three years and Russia did not renew the pact in 1887. On June 15, 1888, the new German Emperor, William II, fired Bismarck and the assurance of a peaceful Europe was jeopardised again. However, the non-renewal of the Bismarck- Gortschakov peace initiative was fortunately counterbalanced by the French-Russian alliance concluded by Minister of War, Freycinet, after the visit of the Tsar to Paris.

The British policy of Edward VII and of George V vis-à-vis France, was an extension of the Alsace-Lorraine policy of 1870. The so-called Alliance Cordiale of 1904 was not as cordiale as one was given to understand. The British wanted to get closer to their victim in order to be in a better position to strike. The British intention was to create diplomatic hostilities between Russia and France, break their alliance, and initiate another war between France and Germany. In that sense, Hanotaux gave a very specific interpretation of the British imperial strategy as a variation on what Palmerston had identified as British “self-interests.” Thus, wrote Hanotaux, “because of her inherent need to constantly replenish her home island, Britain always needs to combine her forces, insufficient in themselves, with those of powers who are opposed to the rivals she fears the most at any given time.” (Hanotaux, Op. Cit., Vol I, 1815, p. 28)

So, according to Hanotaux, up until 1901, the nation Great Britain feared the most was Germany. Thus, Britain’s self interest was to momentarily ally herself with France who should antagonize Germany, but while Britain constantly sought a diplomatic peace with Germany.

The main thing was for the British to do everything to sabotage the Franco-Russian alliance established under Carnot. The British East India company had every reason to also fear France because of her new policy of “colonial expansion,” especially as it had expressed itself by the opening of the Suez Canal, through the initiative of Ferdinand Lesseps and the Ferry-Freycinet-Hanotaux African railway projects. It was, therefore, with a perfidious revenge that the British found the opportunity to buy a majority of shares in the Canal Company, so that, like it or not, France and England would become partners in the Suez Canal. Then, came the June 14, 1898 Convention over French African border lines leading to the British demise of the Meline and Hanotaux government that was followed by the Fachoda incident. This was as warm as it got between the partners of the Anglo-French entente cordiale. (1)

Meanwhile, Britain had already launched a campaign against the industrial products “Made in Germany.” This was a propaganda campaign to capture public opinion at home and around the world against “evil Germany” and “evil German productivity.” What the British did not say, however, was that this entire series of troublesome actions around the world and at home had one, and only one objective: stop the expansion of railroad building among the United States, Germany, France, and Russia.

For example, in 1897, a brochure was put out by Edwin Williams in London on the progress of German markets around the world. In a speech made at the Lambeth Conservative Club, British colonial discoverer, Stanley (Sir Henry Morton), alerted public opinion as follows: “In Australia, we have regressed by 20 % while the Germans have gained by more than 400 %. In New Zeland, we have lost 25%; the German increase is 1,000% . In the colony of the Cape, it is true that our business has grown by 125%, but German commerce has increased tenfold. Even in Canada we have lost by 11%, while the Germans have increased by 300%. “ (Hanotaux, Op. Cit., Vol I, 1915, p. 35.) Thus, Germany became the greatest danger to the British-controlled Synarchy Movement of Empire (SME).

12- BISMARCK OUSTED BY THE HOBREAUX OF PRUSSIA

Hanotaux noted the presence of a decisive oligarchical motivation behind the demise of Bismarck. Emperor William II had been surrounded by

an advisory body of *hobereaux* princes that had total control over him. Hanotaux said that the entire army was bureaucratically under the control of these Prussian *hobereaux*, who addressed the Emperor in the following manner: “The country side is the best recruitment base for your imperial troops. Without us, the army and the monarchy is lost,” claimed the *hobereaux* peasants.



Figure 12. Otto von Bismarck, circa 1884.

As a result, the Emperor got rid of both Bismarck and his successor, Georges Leon Caprivi. Chlodowiz von Hohenlohe, prince de Bullo, and Bethmann-Hooweg went along with the little agrarian nobility which, by 1890, had become all powerful. In fact, according to Hanotaux, the very structure of the Imperial war economy of Germany had been based on the *hobereaux*.

The *hobereaux* were an impoverished residue of the small land squire nobility living mostly as parasites of the State, east of the Elba River. They represented, essentially, a backward agrarian peasantry, generally very poor and living off of the brutish labor of their land; but representing a very powerful feudal political force inside of the bureaucracy of the Prussian Army. The German *hobereaux* were similar in mentality to the agrarian plantation owners in the United States.

More royalist than the King, the *hobereaux* became for the German-Prussian Empire of William II the backbone of his monarchy. Though most of them were bankrupt, they were subsidized as a means of keeping the rest of the peasantry in check and in poverty. They controlled the entire agricultural sector of the east, that is, the better part of the seven provinces of Old Prussia, or about one third of the whole German Empire.

According to Hanotaux, the German *hobereaux* organized themselves into a “League of Agriculture” and became the most powerful political, economic, and military factor in the empire, with the direct, and unmitigated support of the Emperor, himself. Come election time, the “Agrarian League” got a majority of votes.

Hanotaux noted that under William II, the *hobereaux* Party was represented by Comte de Pasadowsky, who, as the Minister of Interior, became the grand master of the economy. Pasadowsky established an infamous border tax whereby, thanks to the most subtle specialisation of products, he succeeded in imposing a disastrous commerce agreement with Russia. According to Hanotaux, this became “the aggressive method by means of which Germany was to break relations with the majority of the great powers.” (Hanotaux, Op. Cit., 1929, p. 46.) As a result, *hobereaux* made a fortune, but the peasants and other badly treated agriculture workers began their disastrous exodus towards the cities.

By April of 1914, the aggressive policy of the *hobereaux* had reached the point where only Russian peasants had been working the lands in East Germany. All of them had been recruited into the army. However, because of the scandalous treatment of foreigners, Russia decided to stop giving visas to their people and the German agriculture market was forced to close down.. Hanotaux reported that since 1891, the *hobereaux* had worked toward making common cause with the pan-german movement of Doctor Hasse, in order to form a war party. (Hanotaux, Op. Cit., 1929, p.49)

At this point, the reader should be made aware of a notable change in Hanotaux’s evaluation of the German question. He correctly identified the backward *hobereaux* flaw as a critical source of the conflict within Germany, but then he goes much further by using the British method of profiling the case on racial grounds. Then, and almost imperceptibly, Hanotaux’s slides into an anti-German posture. For instance, he wrote:

“There is a diplomatic policy; but there is also an ethnographic, economic, and financial policy. Germany has developed in such a manner that it was weighing little by little on its neighbors, and its heavy aggressive method, its competitive procedures often violent and disloyal, its border tariff system and its cartels made these contacts even more difficult. The squireen party (*parti des hobereaux*) was conducting its business as if it had conceded, in advance, that war was the next form of commercial behavior. Thus, Germany found itself wilfully transported toward an economic form of conflict whose consequences she not only accepted but even begged for, whatever they may be. At all cost, the issue was the welfare, the comfort, demanded as a right by a political and materialistic race. ‘A place for Germany, Germany above all!’ such was the motto that rallied everybody, from the last of the workers to the elite of the intellectuals. One did not know the true character of the conflict between peoples, in 1914, if this point of view was not taken under consideration.” (Op. Cit., Vol. I, 1915, p. 42.)

This is where the flaw of character appears in Hanotaux. This is clinically interesting, because the German question is now being treated from the standpoint of a French victim. These racial considerations led Hanotaux to identify what he called the “two Germanies.”

“The German people is not a pure people, it is one of the most mixed people in the world. Celts, Teutons, Scandinavians, Slavics, all fuse themselves into this melting pot which was called, during the Middle Ages, the womb of all of the peoples. The division between northern Germany and southern Germany is classic, but the one which distinguishes East-Germany and West-Germany is not less important, especially when one considers the way the empire is constituted. Professor Wagner said: ‘The true border of Germany is not the Rhine, it is the Elbe.’ Cologne and Berlin are the two poles of that double Germany.” (Op. Cit., 1915, p. 42.)

Hanotaux did not see the British as the source of World War One. He saw the cause in what he called “the latent rivalry of these two forces.” The point is not that these ethnic characteristics did not exist and didn’t play a role, they did. But, what is missing in Hanotaux’s strategic evaluation is the will to change the German situation, from the vantage point of the principle

of the Peace of Westphalia, and bring her into the fold of the American system approach of developing great projects with the colonies. The reason for this weakness is that Westphalian relationship between France and Germany got partly blinded and Hanotaux conceded that, on the German side, the “Peace of Westphalia had been a half-failure.” As if to provide an excuse for his own mistake, Hanotaux warned the reader at the beginning of his report by saying:

“This too quick historical expose does not have the pretention of elucidating the infinitely confusing matter of the German Confederation: it has only one objective: that of showing from the past the root of the current difficulty and locate the key elements of the problem: that is to say, Germany oscillated between dynastic unity, despotic and military, represented, then, by the House of Habsburg, and a constitutional federal unity, as Leibniz had conceived of it, for example. The first system was condemning her irremediably to perpetual war against the rest of Europe; the second system represented an organization for peace and freedom, at the same time solid and malleable! Since that half-failure of the Peace of Westphalia, things have evolved in Germany in such a way that Prussia has retaken from the hands of Austria, with a greater activity, but in even more haughty and rude forms the work of dynastic, despotic, and military centralization...” (Hanotaux, *Op. Cit.*, 1915, p. 6.)

This hesitation between two Germanies is also what clouded Hanotaux’s understanding of Bismarck’s role. (2) As a result, he attributed wrongly the war system to Bismarck. Hanotaux concluded:

“In summation, Bismarck is responsible for the four great wars which, by taking more and more extension, have bloodied the whole of Europe during half a century: the wars of the Duchies, the 1866 war against Austria, the 1870 war against France; and I would add, the war of 1914 against the whole of Europe: since, this last war was within the necessity and the logic of the bismarckian system.” (Hanotaux, *Histoire Illustrée de la Guerre de 1914*, Tome deuxième, 1929, p. 20.)

IN CONCLUSION

At the turn of the twentieth century, the British had either assassinated the French team of the American system or they had them completely excluded from the corridors of power. It was not an accident, for example, that the British had assassinated Presidential candidate Jules Ferry, President Sadi Carnot, and President William Mc Kinley during the same time frame. The British always assassinate for the same reason of “self-interest.” As the situation is being repeated today, the British know that if they could have Presidential Candidate Hilary Clinton assassinated, they could completely destabilize the United States, capture the whole of Europe under the fetters of the Lisbon Treaty, and push the rest of the world into World War Three.

To sum up the situation, the 20 years overlapping the nineteenth and twentieth centuries represented the apogee of the British Empire and the most desperate years for that evil empire to succeed in destroying the world or be destroyed by the American system. The British game plan was so desperate that they made the conscious decision of creating fascist dictatorships around the world with a strategy of a hundred years war. Here are the highlights of British operations, according to Hanotaux, since the disgrace of Bismarck in 1890. The time-line looks like an imperial monopoly game between France and Great Britain.

In 1890, African Cardinal Lavigerie, in the name of Pope Leon XIII, launched the movement to bring civilization to Africa. Leon XIII called for the French clergy to support the Third Republic. Minister of War, Charles Freycinet has already created the crucial appeasement policy of war avoidance with the French-Russian alliance.

In 1891, as Russia started the construction of the trans-Siberian railway, Britain expropriated the great domains of Ireland, and sold them back to their Irish owners. This was the British way of showing how they were willing to share the entire world with other peoples.

In 1893, Britain began by sharing eastern Africa with Germany and got her to agree in taking Wei-Hai-Wei in 1898 against Russia’s holding of Port Arthur in the Far East. The beginning of the end of the British colonial destruction of the French colonization effort came with the assassination of Jules Ferry who died in 1893.

In 1894, the British assassinated Sadi Carnot and launched the Dreyfus Affair to provoke a new war between France and Germany. Hanotaux became Minister of Foreign Affairs and continued the appeasement policy of Carnot until 1898.

By 1898, Britain had destroyed the five pillars of French colonization at Fachoda: Freycinet, Ferry, Carnot, Meline, Hanotaux. The situation led to the Treaty of Delimitation of March 21, 1899, putting an end to Trans-African railway from Dakar to Djibuti and the end of African industrialization.

Next, in 1899, the British Empire took Sudan away from France and used Italy to share the country under a joint British-Egyptian protectorate. In 1901, the British assassinated President William Mc Kinley and allied with Teddy Roosevelt.

In 1902, Britain allied with the Japanese and convinced them to start a war with Russia in 1904-05 over Korea. This is when, for a moment, Britain shared with Germany and France, the fruits of the Japanese war against China over Korea. The 1904 perfidious Alliance Cordiale was signed between France and Britain. But, up until 1913, Britain succeeded in getting World War One regardless of the fact that the French presidencies of Briand, Fallieres, and Poincare all had governments of “appeasement and détente.”

Finally, Britain encouraged the Austro-Hungarian Empire into taking over Bosnia-Herzegovina, which became the Alsace-Lorraine of the Russians, leading directly to the War of 1914. Amazingly, all of this had been done in the name of British “self-interest.” From the end of World War I to the beginning of World War II, the primary objective of the British strategy with respect to France had been to destroy the Third Republic and replace it with a fascist dictatorship. I have reported on this extensively in several reports entitled SYNARCHY MOVEMENT OF EMPIRE (SME). A more recent report of May 8, 2008, on FRENCH GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES ON FASCISM, which goes through the SME sponsored coups d’Etat of Marchal Lyautey in 1927, of Colonel La Rocque in 1934, and of Pierre Laval and Marechal Petain in 1940.

In a nutshell, the great projects for the development of Asia, Africa, Ibero-America had been put off for the interests of Britain, but had not been

killed by these fascist coups. In 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt gave hope to the world that these great development projects would be revived when he told Churchill that, with the end of World War II, America would put an end to British style colonialism, once and for all, and that the future would see the establishment of the American Century. However, Roosevelt died too soon, and the Churchill-Truman team restored British colonialism throughout the planet under the financial authority of the World Bank and the IMF run through the SME. Today, the day has come, again, when the financial crisis is so advanced that only such great projects, as the ones elaborated by Freycinet, Ferry, Carnot, Meline, and Hanotaux, can save humanity from the worse genocidal collapse since the European Black Plague.

The time, therefore, is no longer for diplomacy. Diplomacy must now take sides. The choice is either the British system or the American system. Therefore the time has come where the world has reached the edge of the precipice and there is no turning back. Mankind must now make a leap into the future, risking everything, with its eyes wide open, and conscious of its duties and responsibilities. Hanotaux had already foreseen the coming of this day in 1909. He wrote: "One day, diplomacy will have to learn to take sides; otherwise, it will only inspire doubt and suspicion and will remain in the classical position of the rider sitting between two saddles." (*Fachoda*, p. 130.)

APPENDIX: HANOTAUX ON "THE FUTURE OF AFRICA."

The following excerpts are a summary of a speech *L'avenir de l'Afrique* (*The Future of Africa*) that Gabriel Hanotaux gave in Oran, Algeria, during the spring of 1902. Hanotaux opened his speech to the *Oran Geographic Congress* by emphasizing that Africa had been the last continent to be civilized; and that the advanced sector nations of the world not only had the right but also the moral duty to bring civilization to Africa. Today, the situation has changed. What was a moral duty a century ago has now become a moral imperative in order for the entire world to survive. It has become necessary that such an African development occur now, not only for Africa, but also for the rest of the world, otherwise the whole of mankind will go into a deep New Dark Age.

“Oran, May 2, 1902.

“Gentlemen,

“As far as it is possible for humanity to go back and recall to its collective memory, she finds Africa. Egypt, one finger on the lips, is sitting at the birthplace of civilizations: beyond that, there is only night.

“Today, however, when after ten or twenty centuries (because we cannot enumerate the centuries), man has come full circle around the planet to the last land that he discovers, again, Africa. Africa is at the same time, the most ancient and the most recent conquest of mankind.

“ The world has been occupied, colonized, and civilized before Africa had the chance to be. She was at the doors of civilization, but was merely explored. During the timespan of such a long human history, this continent had missed the ship of history. It is doubly the black continent because it is populated by black populations and also because of the mystery of its destiny.” [...]

“This continent is clearly characterized by three zones: the forest zone practically impenetrable; the desert zone, practically impassable; the mountain zone, practically inaccessible. Between those zones, a few intermediary regions, some rare transition territories. Man is overwhelmed or depressed. Nature renders him anemic or encroaches upon him. From the heavens he has everything to fear, either the sun scorches you, the winds wither everything, or the rains turn all to rot. [...] By some form of deplorable necessity, rape, violence, and war have been the indispensable procedures of social life; insecurity has become the rule; the ferocity of the beasts have reached all the way to man . Servitude has become the end product of this *form of civilization* (if one can use such an expression), just as liberty has become the end product of European civilization.[...]

"However, fortunately, De Lesseps pierced the Isthmus of Suez; making the decisive incision. Thus, he put the entire Eastern coast of Africa into immediate communication with Europe and transformed the Red Sea, which was nothing but a dead end, into a great route for world trade. Africa becomes an island, accessible from all sides to European navigation.[...]

“The rivers repress navigation? Then, from now on, they will have a hard time defending themselves against modern workmanship, which knows how to regulate, channel, or divert their courses. Furthermore, a new means of action comes into line: it is the railroad. Here is the true conqueror of Africa. The railroad goes through deserts; it crosses over cataracts; it connects the superior basins of these great rivers which were separated; it also opens for trade the vast interior plateau and the great lakes, lost for such a long time in the hinterlands, and which will witness the creation of powerful civilizations to be established on their shores.

“The day when science will have effectively routed the (tsetse) fly, one of the greatest benefits which can be spread across the planet by human genius will have been achieved. Half of the African continent will be given back to civilization and to life [...]

“Climate will change with a better organization of natural forces. Deep forests will be pierced through and immense regions will see divine light again. Swamps will be dried up, their draining facilitated, the excessive fecundity, which overwhelms the ground and the waters, shall be contained. By way of an intelligent campaign, the mosquito and the fever that it spreads shall be vanquished.

“Where water is lacking and where it is badly distributed by the caprice of seasons, it will be captured, retained, harnessed, and utilized; the underground water will be pumped up and distributed on the surface; the problem of the desert will be taken on, and one day, through appropriate cultivation, it will be covered by a new sort of richness and fertility [...]

“I spoke of phosphates, tin, calamine, and iron minerals, their exploitation orients toward the industrial development of Algeria, which was up until now exclusively agricultural. There is no lack of coal... Oil has already been found.

“In any event, the harnessing of waterfalls will soon feed African industry with incalculable and inexhaustible energy sources. It is probable that next to those cataracts, there will be powerful stations tapping the necessary forces from the flows of the river itself and producing prodigious wealth of energy for all sorts of exploitation.

”Are we not witnessing the advances, from the coast to the interior, through an international entente which cannot be a universal mistake, different railroad lines which will soon transform the economic life of the entire continent?

“In Algeria, a railroad has for a long time been built along the sea, from Oran to Tunis. And now it is directed in two directions south, either through the Oranais-South toward Ain-Sefra and Duveyrier, or through Biskra and through Southern-Algeria.

“From Djibouti, the Abyssinian railroad is being built in the direction of Harrar. From Zanzibar, the Uganda railroad that goes to Oukala shall become the great artery, which will create the future Great Lake civilization. Etc.”

“Is this not a global program to methodically trace, through an international entente, the directions of a transcontinental railroad, using the great rivers, regulating navigation, connecting the Nile to the Congo, the Benoue to the Sangha, through a vast system of canals, buttressing the development of water ways with railroad development, thus, making of the interior of Africa an immense buzzing hive where trains and steamships capable of devouring great distances will rush towards an immense garage and central depot where all of the peoples and merchandise of the universe will converge?

“Is this not the most obvious and imminent of possibilities? But the great benefit, which civilization must bring to Africa, is firstly peace. Already, the slave trade is under such close scrutiny that the selling of slaves has become a mediocre commerce. Before long, it will have disappeared. [...] But the African pacification must count on a no less precious auxiliary: that is labor... Not toilsome work, not damned and detested labor, but joyous, proud and satisfying labor.

“This land which has been the land of rapine, the land of murder, the land of slavery, the land of bloody sacrifices, this land which pushed man back as if it had him in horror, this land will receive him again and will challenge him.

“Is it too much to ask of the family of civilized peoples, at the moment where she will produce, on the land of Cham, this supreme effort; is it too much to ask of her that the law dictated by her be respected, this law

of justice, of humanity, and of fraternity? “ (Gabriel Hanotaux, *The Future of Africa*, opening conference of the Oran Geographical Congress, May 2 1902, Algeria. Quoted from *Fachoda*, p. 159-177.)

NOTES.

(1) Though Hanotaux had a good insight into the lack of principle in British policy making, he had no real sense of how evil Perfidious Albion was, like Charles de Gaulle had. He conceded that the British were the world champion at mastering “public opinion” and that “English diplomacy rarely proceeds by declarations of principle; she goes from fact to fact and, according to the expression of Bismarck, develops *case by case*.” (Op. Cit., 1915, p. 35.)

Furthermore, none of Hanotaux’s writings indicate that he was aware of the difference between the British and the American economic systems. Nowhere either does he say anything about the building of the Berlin to Bagdad rail line. For example, the only mention of the German project was when, in November 1910, at Potsdam, Germany and Russia signed a sanction in which “the Russian government declared that it was no longer opposed to the construction of the Bagdad railroad.” (Op. Cit., 1915, p.35.) This project was never mentioned with respect to the French African railroad, or the Russian trans-Siberian.

(2) It seems that Hanotaux had no understanding of the role that Bismarck played as the key representative of the American system in Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century; and for similar reasons, he had no understanding of the significance of the the Berlin to Baghdad railroad project. What he reported about the German culture was the enemy image that was reflected in Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Berhhardi.

Because of that shortcoming, his skewed evaluation of Germany in general, and of Bismarck in particular, led him to be trapped by the fallacy of composition which was expressed by the popular German historians who made the claim that the War of 1870, for example, had been caused by the resentment of the French over “Lothringische.” Hanotaux reacted violently to the fact that according to the German history books, “the French could not accept the fact that the Prussians had gained so many victories. They wanted to humiliate King William, and with him, all of the Germans; those on the left bank of the Rhine river had to become French. That is why Napoleon III

declared war against Germany.” (Quoted from a German history book by Hanotiaux, *Histoire Illustrée de la Guerre de 1914*, Vol. I, p. 78.)

As a result, Hanotiaux saw the German political and military elite as having completely internalized the philosophy of Hobbes. “*Homo homini lupus*” (Man is a wolf to man). He said that the Germans became convinced that “*Life is War!*” Such was the ultimate cult of war as represented by Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, a book from which Hanotiaux quoted extensively and which he considered as the manual the Germans used to justify World War I.

However wrong Hanotiaux may have been about his evaluations of Bismarck and Germany, he was right on the mark with his evaluation of Bernhardi. In order to better understand the difference already made between colonization and colonialism, it is useful to compare Bernhardi’s fascist conception of German colonial expansion with the French colonial expansion developed by Freycinet, Ferry, Carnot, and Hanotiaux. Bernhardi wrote:

“It is impossible that German agriculture and industry bring, in the long run a profitable labor income, for such a proportional increase in the mass of working men. We therefore need to increase our colonial empire...But, such a new territorial acquisition is only possible if, under the political allotment of today, it is made *at the expense of other states*, or by associating ourselves with them (such as the case of Holland obviously), and those solutions are practicable only if we first succeed in asserting our power in central Europe.... It is our own economic development which is impaired nationally and politically, it is our own situation which is subjected to prejudice and which is threatened by our position in the world which we have acquired with the noblest blood... We have recognized in ourselves a powerful and necessary factor for the development of all of humanity. That certainty gives us the duty to extend as far as possible, the actions of our moral and intellectual influence, and to open everywhere avenues for German labor, and German idealism.

“However, we cannot fulfill these supreme duties, *imposed by our degree of civilization*, unless our work for civilization is sustained by an increased political power – a power which must find its expansion in the extension of our colonial possessions, in the expansion of our commerce, in the increasing influence of German

ideas *in all the countries of the world*, and above all, in the complete consolidation of our power over Europe.” (Quoted and highlighted by Gabriel Hanotaux, *Histoire Illustrée de la Guerre de 1914*, Vol. I, p. 81.)

Interestingly, Hanotaux also considered that it was for that very reason that the Germans lost World War I. He concluded with this important insight: “If Germany had been more generous she would have been invincible!” (Hanotaux, *Histoire Illustrée de la Guerre de 1914*, Vol. II, p. 82)

OTHER RECOMMENDED REPORTS:

- Jacques Cheminade, FACHODA, QUAND LES NUEES PORTENT L'ORAGE, *Nouvelle Solidarité*, Written in 1991 and republished Friday May 2, 2008.
- Dana Scanlon, GABRIEL HANOTAUX : THE PASSION TO KNOW WHAT MADE FRANCE A GREAT NATION, [95-06-6/dss001]
- Dana Scanlon, HANOTAUX AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE, [95-09-4/dss001].
- Bill Jones, THE POLICY OF WITTE AND HANOTAUX IN THE FAR EAST, [95-04-4/WCJ001]

FIN